



OKINAWA PREFECTURAL GOVERNMENT

1-2-2 Izumizaki, Naha
Okinawa 900-8570, Japan

January 13, 2021

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden
President-Elect
United States of America
1401 Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20230

The Honorable Kamala Harris
Vice President-Elect
United States of America
1401 Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20230

Dear President-Elect Biden and Vice President-Elect Harris,

On behalf of the 1.45 million people of Okinawa, Japan, I would like to congratulate you on your election to be the next President and Vice President of the United States. We appreciate the United States' tremendous contributions to Japan's national security as well as to the peace and stability in East Asia.

Many people in the United States have personal relationships with Okinawa. For example, the Okinawa Association of America in the State of California has the largest membership in the mainland United States, and it has reached over 1,000 members. Likewise, about 50,000 people in the State of Hawaii have Okinawan ancestry through immigration. The people of Okinawa also have fostered its unique culture by incorporating American culture after World War II. These symbolize the strong, history-based ties between the United States and Okinawa, and I look forward to building close relations with your Administration.

I understand that Japan-U.S. relations, including the bilateral security alliance, have contributed greatly to Japan's national security as well as the peace and stability in East Asia. Meanwhile, Okinawa has played a disproportionately large role in upholding the alliance. More than 70 percent of the military facilities exclusively used by the U.S. forces in Japan (including Kadena Air Base) are concentrated on Okinawa, even though Okinawa accounts for only 0.6 percent of the entire land area of Japan. This has led to numerous difficulties for the people of Okinawa since the end of World War II. These include military

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aircraft noise/accidents, unfortunate crimes committed by U.S. service members, and environmental pollution by toxic substances such as PFAS,

Given the recent military rise of China, the U.S. military bases concentrated in Okinawa have become increasingly vulnerable. I am aware that the U.S. Marines have introduced new operational concepts such as the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) and are shifting to deploying more dispersed, small-scale capabilities over the Indo-Pacific. In the hope of keeping the Japan-U.S. alliance sustainable, I would like to request your support to reduce the military footprint in Okinawa when making further decisions regarding Indo-Pacific policies.

Currently, the construction project of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) on Okinawa faces strong public opposition. The former Governor Takeshi Onaga and I won the gubernatorial elections by holding up a campaign promise to oppose the plan. In a prefectural referendum on the FRF project, 434,273 people, accounting for the overwhelming majority of total voters (71.7 percent), casted votes in opposition to the project.

The construction plan requires large-scale land reclamation work, but the ocean where the work is planned is globally known for its vast biodiversity and is home to endangered marine mammals such as dugongs. Since the seabed that will be reclaimed is as soft as mayonnaise, the project requires a massive foundation improvement by driving 71,000 piles into the seabed. The Japanese government, which oversees the project, currently estimates that the construction will take at least another 12 years with an overall cost of about \$9.3 billion. Geologists also warn of the risk of potential uneven ground subsidence because about 70% of the reclamation work will be conducted in an area where the water is very deep, the seabed is very uneven, and the soft foundation is distributed randomly. The seismic activities in the area have also been addressed by experts, who have expressed concern about the existence of active earthquake fault lines.

These difficulties could adversely impact the Marines' future operations in the FRF even after the project is completed more than 10 years from now. If a strong earthquake occurs in the area, it could cause serious risks to U.S. service members, the Marines' equipment and facilities, and the overall U.S. national interest. With these issues in mind, I would like to request a comprehensive reassessment of the project by your Administration.

We thank you for your attention in this matter and look forward to working together.

Sincerely,



Denny Tamaki
Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, Japan



OKINAWA PREFECTURAL GOVERNMENT

1-2-2 Izumizaki, Naha
Okinawa 900-8570, Japan

February 1, 2021

The Honorable Adam Smith
Chairman
House Armed Services Committee
2264 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairman Smith,

I would like to congratulate you on your re-election to the U.S. House of Representatives.

We appreciate the United States' tremendous contributions to Japan's national security as well as the peace and stability in East Asia. I understand that Japan-U.S. relations, including the bilateral security alliance, have contributed greatly to Japan's national security as well as to the peace and stability in East Asia.

Meanwhile, Okinawa has played a disproportionately large role in upholding the alliance by hosting many U.S. military facilities. While Okinawa accounts for only 0.6 percent of the entire land area of Japan, more than 70.3 percent of the military facilities exclusively used by U.S. forces in Japan are concentrated on Okinawa. This has led to numerous difficulties for the people of Okinawa since the end of World War II. These include military aircraft noises and accidents, unfortunate crimes committed by U.S. service members, and environmental pollution by toxic substances such as per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). To reduce such disproportional military footprint in Okinawa, I believe that it is important to proceed with the relocation of the U.S. Marines from Okinawa to overseas locations such as Guam.

Additionally, the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), the new base that is being constructed in the Henoko area of Okinawa by the Japanese and U.S. governments, faces various issues. It concerns me that these issues may adversely affect the U.S. military's sustainable operations and readiness. For example, in addition to the construction delays that have already occurred, further delays are projected to solidify the unstable seabed said to be as soft as mayonnaise, an issue that has been recognized by the Japanese government. The total cost of the project is estimated to be quadruple that of the original plan. Geologists warn that even after the project is completed more than 10 years from now, there are risks of potential ground subsidence and seismic activities caused by active earthquake fault lines located in the area. Given these issues, I question whether the new facility would be fully operational as a U.S. military facility.

There are questions as to whether the current FRF plan, which was originally created more than 20 years ago, would be capable of supporting the Marines' current and future strategical priorities, which have been shifting rapidly due to changes in the security landscape of East Asia. In April 2017, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that the runways that will be constructed as a part

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of the FRF will be too short for the military operations intended by the Marines. The new runways are scheduled to be only 1,200 meters-long, compared to the runway in the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, which is 2,800 meters-long.

The FRF construction project faces environmental issue too. Okinawa is home to endangered marine mammals such as dugongs. The Oura Bay in Henoko is particularly important for dugongs' survival, given the seagrass beds in the bay serve as the dugongs' feeding ground. Since the construction project has started in the area, we have not seen any dugongs. In December 2019, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) re-categorized dugongs living in the waters near Okinawa as "critically endangered" and labeled the construction project as a "major concern" threatening the mammal's habitat.

Furthermore, in June 2020, during the process of drafting the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness approved report language addressing the subcommittee's concerns over the FRF plan, particularly the existence of the active earthquake fault lines underneath. My understanding is that the subcommittee has directed the U.S. Department of Defense to submit a report on the progress of the FRF project.

I would like to solemnly request that you and your colleagues consider the above issues as you discuss the FY 2022 NDAA in Congress. As an indispensable partner to maintain the Japan-U.S. alliance, I request your understanding and support for our cause of reducing the military footprint in Okinawa.

Thank you very much and I look forward to seeing you in Washington D.C. during the 117th Congress.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Denny Tamaki", written in a cursive style.

Denny Tamaki
Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, Japan

Subject: OKINAWA WEBINAR : TECHNICAL ISSUES OF FUTENMA REPLACEMENT FACILITY - March 22, 2021 (Monday) 17:00-17:45 (EST)
From: Okinawa Prefecture <office@pref.okinawa.dc-office.org>
Date: 3/9/2021, 12:06 PM
To: "uechist@pref.okinawa.dc-office.org" <uechist@pref.okinawa.dc-office.org>
BCC: "Matt.Rhoades@mail.house.gov" <Matt.Rhoades@mail.house.gov>, "paul.arcangeli@mail.house.gov" <paul.arcangeli@mail.house.gov>, "Forrest.McConnell@mail.house.gov" <Forrest.McConnell@mail.house.gov>, "david.sienicki@mail.house.gov" <david.sienicki@mail.house.gov>, "Chrissi.Lee@mail.house.gov" <Chrissi.Lee@mail.house.gov>, "Ryan.Ehly@mail.house.gov" <Ryan.Ehly@mail.house.gov>, "Collins, Brian" <Brian.Collins@mail.house.gov>, "Max Huntley (Speier)" <Max.Huntley@mail.house.gov>, "Rodney.Hall@mail.house.gov" <Rodney.Hall@mail.house.gov>, "sam.menchel@mail.house.gov" <sam.menchel@mail.house.gov>, "Bartlett, Joe" <Joe.Bartlett@mail.house.gov>, "Siegel, Shira" <shira.siegel@mail.house.gov>, "Michael.Galgagni@mail.house.gov" <Michael.Galgagni@mail.house.gov>, "Nathan.Riggins@mail.house.gov" <Nathan.Riggins@mail.house.gov>, "Andrew.Braun@mail.house.gov" <Andrew.Braun@mail.house.gov>, "Thompson, Betsy" <Betsy.Thompson@mail.house.gov>, "jason.lumia@mail.house.gov" <jason.lumia@mail.house.gov>, "Benjamin.Loewy@mail.house.gov" <Benjamin.Loewy@mail.house.gov>, "jonathan.rayner@mail.house.gov" <jonathan.rayner@mail.house.gov>, "Evan.Hendler@mail.house.gov" <Evan.Hendler@mail.house.gov>, "Salzer, Michael" <michael.salzer@mail.house.gov>, "chris.vieson@mail.house.gov" <chris.vieson@mail.house.gov>, "Maddock, Ryan" <ryan.maddock@mail.house.gov>, "caitlin.frazer@mail.house.gov" <caitlin.frazer@mail.house.gov>, "Goodson, Caroline" <Caroline.Goodson@mail.house.gov>, "rachel.brandenburg@mail.house.gov" <rachel.brandenburg@mail.house.gov>, "Flood, Patrick" <Patrick.Flood@mail.house.gov>, "Dylan.Klossner@mail.house.gov" <Dylan.Klossner@mail.house.gov>, "LEIGH.MAIDEN@mail.house.gov" <LEIGH.MAIDEN@mail.house.gov>, "matthew.rich@mail.house.gov" <matthew.rich@mail.house.gov>, "lindsay.markle@mail.house.gov" <lindsay.markle@mail.house.gov>, "jon.green@mail.house.gov" <jon.green@mail.house.gov>, "Davidson, Scott" <scott.davidson@mail.house.gov>, "drew.kennedy@mail.house.gov" <drew.kennedy@mail.house.gov>, "Ertl, Andrew" <andrew.ertl@mail.house.gov>, "michelle.jelnicky@mail.house.gov" <michelle.jelnicky@mail.house.gov>, "hector.arguello@mail.house.gov" <hector.arguello@mail.house.gov>, "Brent.Jurmu@mail.house.gov" <Brent.Jurmu@mail.house.gov>, "shaefer.bagwell@mail.house.gov" <shaefer.bagwell@mail.house.gov>, "tony.bourdeau@mail.house.gov" <tony.bourdeau@mail.house.gov>, "geo.saba@mail.house.gov" <geo.saba@mail.house.gov>, "Katy.Nazaretova@mail.house.gov" <Katy.Nazaretova@mail.house.gov>, "hannah.russell@mail.house.gov" <hannah.russell@mail.house.gov>, "Price, Samantha" <Samantha.Price@mail.house.gov>, "alex.sabater@mail.house.gov" <alex.sabater@mail.house.gov>, "julie.devine@mail.house.gov" <julie.devine@mail.house.gov>, "CARYN.HAMNER@mail.house.gov" <CARYN.HAMNER@mail.house.gov>, "maria.oparil@mail.house.gov" <maria.oparil@mail.house.gov>, "Dube, Luke" <luke.dube@mail.house.gov>, "Corona, Anthony" <anthony.corona@mail.house.gov>, "Kuhn, Amy" <amy.kuhn@mail.house.gov>, "Price.Balderson@mail.house.gov" <Price.Balderson@mail.house.gov>, "james.loomis@mail.house.gov" <james.loomis@mail.house.gov>, "robert.ikoku@mail.house.gov" <robert.ikoku@mail.house.gov>

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"charles.morrison@mail.house.gov" <charles.morrison@mail.house.gov>, "Lerma Jr., Eduardo" <Eduardo.Lerma@mail.house.gov>, "christine.wagner@mail.house.gov" <christine.wagner@mail.house.gov>, "Noh, Andrew" <noh@mail.house.gov>, "joseph.danaher@mail.house.gov" <joseph.danaher@mail.house.gov>, "Albro, Amy" <amy.albro@mail.house.gov>, "garrett.fultz@mail.house.gov" <garrett.fultz@mail.house.gov>, "Kelly, Melissa" <melissa.kelly@mail.house.gov>, "Thompson, Jett" <Jett.Thompson@mail.house.gov>, "Hawatmeh, Nick" <nick.hawatmeh@mail.house.gov>, "Brody, Bryan" <Bryan.Brody@mail.house.gov>, "Billman, Jeff" <jeff.billman@mail.house.gov>, "devon.murphy@mail.house.gov" <devon.murphy@mail.house.gov>, "brian.garrett@mail.house.gov" <brian.garrett@mail.house.gov>, "Thaddeus.Woody@mail.house.gov" <Thaddeus.Woody@mail.house.gov>, "jae.lee@mail.house.gov" <jae.lee@mail.house.gov>, "rachel.wagley@mail.house.gov" <rachel.wagley@mail.house.gov>, "Bishop, Matthew" <matthew.bishop@mail.house.gov>, "erik.simien@mail.house.gov" <erik.simien@mail.house.gov>, "matt.manning@mail.house.gov" <matt.manning@mail.house.gov>, "JEANINE.WOMBLE@MAIL.HOUSE.GOV" <JEANINE.WOMBLE@MAIL.HOUSE.GOV>, Kenny Yamashiro <yamashkn@pref.okinawa.dc-office.org>

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OKINAWA WEBINAR : TECHNICAL ISSUES OF FUTENMA REPLACEMENT FACILITY

March 22, 2021 (Monday) 17:00-17:45 (EST)

Japan and the United States both continue to adjust their security strategies to counter China's strategic and tactical military rise. As this happens, some experts are starting to reevaluate whether security infrastructure will meet the future demands of the East Asian security landscape. One facility being reevaluated is the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), which is being constructed by the Japanese and U.S. governments in Henoko, Okinawa. Various technical, operational, and environmental problems have arisen at the facility.

The soft ground located in the seabed of the construction site presents a particularly challenging technical problem, and the Japanese government is considering the need for additional improvement work to stabilize it. Under these circumstances, it will take at least an estimated 12 years before the FRF is fully operational, and the cost is currently expected to be four times the initial estimate. The seismic activities in the area have also been addressed by experts, who have expressed concern about the existence of active earthquake fault lines. In this webinar, we will welcome Associate Professor [Shoji Kamao](#) of Nihon University, who specializes in geotechnical engineering, to discuss the technical issues surrounding the construction of the FRF, the future outlook for the project, and the implications for the Japan-U.S. security alliance readiness.

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We look forward to seeing you there.

Okinawa Prefecture Washington D.C. Office

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From: Okinawa Prefecture <office@pref.okinawa.dc-office.org>
Date: 3/9/2021, 1:15 PM
To: "uechist@pref.okinawa.dc-office.org" <uechist@pref.okinawa.dc-office.org>
BCC: "Nobrega, John (Reed)" <john_nobrega@reed.senate.gov>,
 "jeremy_hayes@ernst.senate.gov" <jeremy_hayes@ernst.senate.gov>, "Noblet, Michael (Armed Services)" <Michael_Noblet@armed-services.senate.gov>, "lauren_canfield@tillis.senate.gov" <lauren_canfield@tillis.senate.gov>, "frank_tedeschi@rounds.senate.gov" <frank_tedeschi@rounds.senate.gov>, "Don_Archer@inchofe.senate.gov" <Don_Archer@inchofe.senate.gov>, "zephrairie_buetow@peters.senate.gov" <zephrairie_buetow@peters.senate.gov>, "Mathur, Sachin (Gillibrand)" <Sachin_Mathur@gillibrand.senate.gov>, "steve_smith@king.senate.gov" <steve_smith@king.senate.gov>, "Friction, Tom (Gillibrand)" <Tom_Friction@gillibrand.senate.gov>, "Collen_Lewis@manchin.senate.gov" <Collen_Lewis@manchin.senate.gov>, "jason_suslavich@sullivan.senate.gov" <jason_suslavich@sullivan.senate.gov>, "catherine_barrett@peters.senate.gov" <catherine_barrett@peters.senate.gov>, "JONATHAN_RUE@warren.senate.gov" <JONATHAN_RUE@warren.senate.gov>, "DAN_DUNHAM@FISCHER.SENATE.GOV" <DAN_DUNHAM@FISCHER.SENATE.GOV>, "Kane, Abigail (Shaheen)" <Abigail_Kane@shaheen.senate.gov>, "colby_kuhns@cramer.senate.gov" <colby_kuhns@cramer.senate.gov>, "Emily Natori (MLA, Hirono)" <Emily_Natori@hirono.senate.gov>, "EMILY_MANNING@BLACKBURN.SENATE.GOV" <EMILY_MANNING@BLACKBURN.SENATE.GOV>, "RICK_TRIMBLE@Hawley.Senate.Gov" <RICK_TRIMBLE@Hawley.Senate.Gov>, "Colvert, Ryan (Kaine)" <ryan_colvert@kaine.senate.gov>, "joel_kelsey@blumenthal.senate.gov" <joel_kelsey@blumenthal.senate.gov>, "PATRICK_THOMPSON@WICKER.SENATE.GOV" <PATRICK_THOMPSON@WICKER.SENATE.GOV>, "PAUL_BONICELLI@RICKSCOTT.SENATE.GOV" <PAUL_BONICELLI@RICKSCOTT.SENATE.GOV>, "Whiting, Ethan (Duckworth)" <Ethan_Whiting@duckworth.senate.gov>, "Grace_Carson@duckworth.senate.gov" <Grace_Carson@duckworth.senate.gov>, "stephen_boyd@tuberville.senate.gov" <stephen_boyd@tuberville.senate.gov>, "daniel_bleiberg@rosen.senate.gov" <daniel_bleiberg@rosen.senate.gov>, "Descamps, Claire (Gillibrand)" <Claire_Descamps@gillibrand.senate.gov>, "Holder, Dan (Inchofe)" <Dan_Holder@inchofe.senate.gov>, "Koncar, Joshua (Duckworth)" <Joshua_Koncar@duckworth.senate.gov>, "Hajdukovich, Connor (Sullivan)" <Connor_Hajdukovich@sullivan.senate.gov>, "jennifer_cox@kelly.senate.gov" <jennifer_cox@kelly.senate.gov>, "Adamson, Scott (Sullivan)" <Scott_Adamson@sullivan.senate.gov>, "Banicki, Liz (Sullivan)" <liz_banicki@sullivan.senate.gov>, "Trizza, Sam (Inchofe)" <Sam_Trizza@inchofe.senate.gov>, "CJ_Kiernan@RICKSCOTT.SENATE.GOV" <CJ_Kiernan@RICKSCOTT.SENATE.GOV>, "Pritchard, Edward (Blackburn)" <Edward_Pritchard@blackburn.senate.gov>, "kristen.johnson@cotton.senate.gov" <kristen.johnson@cotton.senate.gov>, "Allen, Katie" <katie.allen@mail.house.gov>, "Banerjee, Amrita" <Amrita.Banerjee@mail.house.gov>, "ben.peterson@mail.house.gov" <ben.peterson@mail.house.gov>, "cesar.gonzalez@mail.house.gov" <cesar.gonzalez@mail.house.gov>, "chandler.m.smith@mail.house.gov" <chandler.m.smith@mail.house.gov>, "christian.walker@mail.house.gov" <christian.walker@mail.house.gov>, "Christopher, Jeremy" <Jeremy.Christopher@mail.house.gov>, "David.Barreras@mail.house.gov" <David.Barreras@mail.house.gov>, "elliott.Phaup@mail.house.gov"

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<elliott.Phaup@mail.house.gov>, "heather.campbell@mail.house.gov"
 <heather.campbell@mail.house.gov>, "jack.spasiano@mail.house.gov"
 <jack.spasiano@mail.house.gov>, "james.cho2@mail.house.gov" <james.cho2@mail.house.gov>,
 "jenny.perrino@mail.house.gov" <jenny.perrino@mail.house.gov>,
 "john.whitney@mail.house.gov" <john.whitney@mail.house.gov>, "Keating, Ryan"
 <ryan.keating@mail.house.gov>, "Natalia.Gruenbaum@mail.house.gov"
 <Natalia.Gruenbaum@mail.house.gov>, "Peard, Bowen" <Bowen.Peard@mail.house.gov>, "Rajan,
 Thu" <Thu.Rajan@mail.house.gov>, "ryan.mcguire@mail.house.gov"
 <ryan.mcguire@mail.house.gov>, "Tener, William" <william.tener@mail.house.gov>, "Ward,
 Nicole" <Nicole.Ward@mail.house.gov>, "wendell.white@mail.house.gov"
 <wendell.white@mail.house.gov>, "william.palmer@mail.house.gov"
 <william.palmer@mail.house.gov>, "Williams, Anthony" <Anthony.Williams@mail.house.gov>,
 "Yusuf.Nekzad@mail.house.gov" <Yusuf.Nekzad@mail.house.gov>, "Barry.Smith@mail.house.gov"
 <Barry.Smith@mail.house.gov>, "brendan.shields@mail.house.gov"
 <brendan.shields@mail.house.gov>, "catherine.rowland@mail.house.gov"
 <catherine.rowland@mail.house.gov>, "christopher.fernandez2@mail.house.gov"
 <christopher.fernandez2@mail.house.gov>, "Cohen, Joel" <Joel.Cohen@mail.house.gov>,
 "corey.jacobson@mail.house.gov" <corey.jacobson@mail.house.gov>,
 "jessie.durrett@mail.house.gov" <jessie.durrett@mail.house.gov>,
 "johan.propst@mail.house.gov" <johan.propst@mail.house.gov>, "kelvin.lum@mail.house.gov"
 <kelvin.lum@mail.house.gov>, "libby.tidwell@mail.house.gov" <libby.tidwell@mail.house.gov>,
 "molly.burke@mail.house.gov" <molly.burke@mail.house.gov>, "molly.cole@mail.house.gov"
 <molly.cole@mail.house.gov>, "philip.bednarczyk@mail.house.gov"
 <philip.bednarczyk@mail.house.gov>, "Rosenbaum, Ben" <ben.rosenbaum@mail.house.gov>,
 "Roshan, Qais" <Qais.Roshan@mail.house.gov>, "sarah.curtis@mail.house.gov"
 <sarah.curtis@mail.house.gov>, "ben.chao@mail.house.gov" <ben.chao@mail.house.gov>,
 "bob.schwalbach (Sablan)" <bob.schwalbach@mail.house.gov>,
 "Dominic_Saavedra@heinrich.senate.gov" <Dominic_Saavedra@heinrich.senate.gov>,
 "Eric_Altamura@schumer.senate.gov" <Eric_Altamura@schumer.senate.gov>, "herb.yamada
 (Sablan)" <herb.yamada@mail.house.gov>, "Ron_Anderson@Cassidy.Senate.Gov"
 <Ron_Anderson@Cassidy.Senate.Gov>, "Shanise.Kaaikala@mail.house.gov"
 <Shanise.Kaaikala@mail.house.gov>, "tim.nelson (Ed Case)" <tim.nelson@mail.house.gov>,
 "Yazeed_Abdelhaq@schumer.senate.gov" <Yazeed_Abdelhaq@schumer.senate.gov>,
 "blake_souter@baldwin.senate.gov" <blake_souter@baldwin.senate.gov>, "Bombach, Rachel
 Gorsky (Feinstein)" <rachel_bombach@feinstein.senate.gov>, "chris_homan@durbin.senate.gov"
 <chris_homan@durbin.senate.gov>, "craig_abele@lgraham.senate.gov"
 <craig_abele@lgraham.senate.gov>, "Heller, Alexandra (Feinstein)"
 <Alexandra_Heller@feinstein.senate.gov>, "josh_carter@hoeven.senate.gov"
 <josh_carter@hoeven.senate.gov>, "Machuca, Liliana (Feinstein)"
 <Liliana_Machuca@feinstein.senate.gov>, "mark_mckinnon@shelby.senate.gov"
 <mark_mckinnon@shelby.senate.gov>, "matthew_hickey@murkowski.senate.gov"
 <matthew_hickey@murkowski.senate.gov>, "patrick_mcguigan@boozman.senate.gov"
 <patrick_mcguigan@boozman.senate.gov>, "robert_karem@mcconnell.senate.gov"
 <robert_karem@mcconnell.senate.gov>, "Ryan_Pettit@murray.senate.gov"
 <Ryan_Pettit@murray.senate.gov>, "Schunk, Peter (Collins)" <Peter_Schunk@collins.senate.gov>,
 "Schwartz, Hannah (Blunt)" <hannah_schwartz@blunt.senate.gov>,
 "scott_nulty@moran.senate.gov" <scott_nulty@moran.senate.gov>,
 "sherman_patrick@leahy.senate.gov" <sherman_patrick@leahy.senate.gov>,
 "timothy_aanerud@tester.senate.gov" <timothy_aanerud@tester.senate.gov>, "Wakefield, Mike

(Collins)" <mike_wakefield@collins.senate.gov>, "will_rogers@schatz.senate.gov" <will_rogers@schatz.senate.gov>, "Zaheer, Sara (Murray)" <Sara_Zaheer@murray.senate.gov>, "BRANDT_ANDERSON@YOUNG.SENATE.GOV" <BRANDT_ANDERSON@YOUNG.SENATE.GOV>, "bryson_wong@risch.senate.gov" <bryson_wong@risch.senate.gov>, "carol_fowler@ronjohnson.senate.gov" <carol_fowler@ronjohnson.senate.gov>, "matt_squeri@merkley.senate.gov" <matt_squeri@merkley.senate.gov>, "Michael_Schiffer@foreign.senate.gov" <Michael_Schiffer@foreign.senate.gov>, "Narendra, Blake (Markey)" <Blake_Narendra@markey.senate.gov>, "Rasins, Ryan (Rubio)" <Ryan_Rasins@rubio.senate.gov>, "Roachford, Keith (Menendez)" <keith_roachford@menendez.senate.gov>, "Stebbins, Justin (Ron Johnson)" <Justin_Stebbins@ronjohnson.senate.gov>, "thomas_mancinelli@coons.senate.gov" <thomas_mancinelli@coons.senate.gov>, "Trent, Mercedes (Markey)" <Mercedes_Trent@markey.senate.gov>, "Trister, Sarah (Markey)" <sarah_trister@markey.senate.gov>, "Truxal, Charles (Rubio)" <charles_truxal@rubio.senate.gov>, "echanlettavery@crs.loc.gov" <echanlettavery@crs.loc.gov>, "mmanyin@crs.loc.gov" <mmanyin@crs.loc.gov>, Kenny Yamashiro <yamashkn@pref.okinawa.dc-office.org>

Okinawa Prefecture Washington D.C. Office cordially invites you to

OKINAWA WEBINAR : TECHNICAL ISSUES OF FUTENMA REPLACEMENT FACILITY

March 22, 2021 (Monday) 17:00-17:45 (EST)

Japan and the United States both continue to adjust their security strategies to counter China's strategic and tactical military rise. As this happens, some experts are starting to reevaluate whether security infrastructure will meet the future demands of the East Asian security landscape. One facility being reevaluated is the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), which is being constructed by the Japanese and U.S. governments in Henoko, Okinawa. Various technical, operational, and environmental problems have arisen at the facility.

The soft ground located in the seabed of the construction site presents a particularly challenging technical problem, and the Japanese government is considering the need for additional improvement work to stabilize it. Under these circumstances, it will take at least an estimated 12 years before the FRF is fully operational, and the cost is currently expected to be four times the initial estimate. The seismic activities in the area have also been addressed by experts, who have expressed concern about the existence of active earthquake fault lines. In this webinar, we will welcome Associate Professor [Shoji Kamao](#) of Nihon University, who specializes in geotechnical engineering, to discuss the technical issues surrounding the construction of the FRF, the future outlook for the project, and the implications for the Japan-U.S. security alliance readiness.

Click here for more information.

Sign up here for registration.

We look forward to seeing you there.

Okinawa Prefecture Washington D.C. Office

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The poster features a vibrant underwater scene with two clownfish swimming near a coral reef. The title "Henoko-Ōura Coastal Waters Hope Spot" is prominently displayed at the top in white text. Below it, the text "Japan's first Hope Spot" and "Ayuda Bann | 2020.10.20" are visible. On the right side, the "MISSION BLUE" logo is shown, along with a circular portrait of Sylvia Earle, PhD, and her title "President & Chairman".

**Henoko-Ōura Coastal Waters
Hope Spot**

Japan's first Hope Spot
Ayuda Bann | 2020.10.20

MISSION BLUE
SYLVIA EARLE ALLIANCE

Sylvia Earle, PhD
President & Chairman

The coastal waters of Henoko-Ōura in Japan are an understated natural wonder.

<https://mission-blue.org/>

【Lecture Outline】

- (1)Existence of active faults
- (2)Sedimentation of soft soil
- (3)Site investigation of the soft soil layer
- (4)Ground improvement method for the soft soil layer
- (5)Problems after changing the design

〈The Active Faults near Henoko〉




Suspected active faults can be seen from Nago Bay to Oura Bay

出典：新編 日本の活断層分布図と資料 活断層研究会

〈The Active Faults near Cape Henoko〉



【Documents from 20 years ago】




Infrastructure on the active faults

(Ishioka Dam, Taiwan, 1999)




<https://blogs.yahoo.co.jp/sprmpy497/2370123.html>

釣鯊攝影版權所有、翻印必究



【Initial design of caisson revetment】




出典・普天間飛行場代替施設建設事業に係る環境影響評価書要約書〈沖縄防衛局〉
<http://www.mod.go.jp/rdb/okinawa/07oshirase/chotatsu/hyaukyouyakuhassei/S.pdf>

<N-value from Standard Penetration Test> **JIS A 1219**

N-value :

The number of blows needed to drive the SPT sampler 300 mm into the ground

Weight of hammer : 63.5kg (140 lbs.)
 Height of Free fall : 76cm (30 inches)
 Penetration of Sampler : 30cm (12 inches)




<The Data from Boring>


(sites B-26 and B-28)

Yellow : Loose sand
 Light blue : Soft clay




**N-values are
almost zero**





【Estimation from Other Data (B-27)】



【Different types of Soft Soil (B-27 and others)】





Clay Contents of Soil

Depth	B-27	S-20	B-58	S-3
65m	98.0	96.8	75.7	97.1
69m	98.0	76.4	73.7	91.2
73m	99.0	68.1	63.5	82.8
77m	93.4	68.0	-	79.3
81m	96.8	77.2	-	38.1
85m	94.9	46.2	-	22.7
89m	24.2	23.2	-	-
93m	4.6	18.7	-	-

Unit : %

Tokyo Shimbun News Paper (April 4, 2020)



Thank you for your attention!

**The Okinawa Prefectural Government requests the U.S. Congress act to ensure
that the U.S. military adheres strictly to the agreed-upon Aircraft Noise
Abatement Countermeasures at MCAS Futenma**

June 24, 2021

Okinawa Prefectural Government

SUMMARY

Japan and the United States signed an agreement called "the Aircraft Noise Abatement Countermeasures at Futenma Air Station"¹ in 1996 to address the concerns over U.S. military aircraft's noise level raised by the local community in Okinawa. The agreement dictates that U.S. military aircraft entering to and exiting from Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) should avoid flying over densely populated areas as much as possible, including hospitals and schools. However, there has been repeated evidence that such aircrafts are flying over a nearby nursery school, and it continues to make local residents worried. The Okinawa Prefectural Government is hereby requesting that the U.S. Congress act to ensure that the U.S. military strictly adheres to the agreed countermeasures and takes the local community's voices seriously.

(1) The 2017 Incident at a Local Nursery School

On December 7, 2017, a plastic tube that looked like an aircraft part was found on the rooftop of Midorigaoka Nursery School, which is located in the vicinity of MCAS Futenma. At the time, about 40 to 50 children were playing on the nearby ground. Okinawa Prefectural Government took this incident very seriously as it could have caused damage to human life and local properties.

Figures: A plastic tube presumed to have been dropped from a U.S. military helicopter



In response to our inquiry, U.S. Marines admitted that the plastic tube was a component part of the rotor of a CH-53E helicopter; however, they have categorically denied any possibility of their helicopter having dropped the part. Because of this and ongoing disregard of the 1996 agreement by US military pilots, the parents of the nursery school children are requesting the launch of an investigation into the cause of this incident.

¹ https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/sfa/pdfs/souon_kisei_e.pdf
https://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/eap/japan/rpt-saco_final_961202.html

(2) The Aircraft Noise Abatement Countermeasures at Futenma Air Station

The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee announced its agreement on the Aircraft Noise Abatement Countermeasures at Futenma Air Station in March 1996. It dictates that "Airfield traffic pattern² configuration, including entry and exit routes, should be designed to avoid over flight of densely populated areas, including schools and hospitals, as much as possible."

According to the local municipality hosting MCAS Futenma, Midorigaoka Nursery School is located outside of the designated airfield traffic patterns. This means that U.S. military aircraft should refrain from flying over the area. Nevertheless, the CII-53E component was found on the nursery school, and U.S. military aircraft are regularly seen flying over the area. The Okinawa Prefectural Government and the parent group have continuously requested the U.S. Marines strictly adhere to the agreement stemming from MCAS Futenma and to avoid flying over the nursery school.

(3) The Current Status of U.S. Military Aircraft Flight over the Nursery School

Taking this incident as well addressing additional complaints from the local community seriously, the Japanese Ministry of Defense has conducted the investigations and collected data on MCAS Futenma's traffic patterns in the area since January 2010. Their recent data shows that U.S. Marines' aircrafts continue flying over the area. Video footage³ captured by staff of the school provides additional evidence of the U.S. Marines not following the countermeasures agreed by the Japanese and U.S. governments (see the images from the video below).

Figures: U.S. military aircrafts flying over Midorigaoka Nursery School (images from the video)



(4) The Okinawa Prefectural Government's Requests to the U.S. Congress

The Okinawa Prefectural Government hereby requests that the U.S. Congress exercise oversight authority to ensure that the U.S. military strictly adheres to the agreed countermeasures of noise pollution stemming from MCAS Futenma. This includes avoiding flying over the densely populated areas. Noise pollution is the primary focus of the agreement; however, the local community is also deeply worried that any accidents or incidents in the area could result in loss of human life and property. We would be happy to provide additional information on this matter upon your request.

² An airfield traffic pattern is a standard path followed by aircraft when taking off or landing while maintaining visual contact with the airfield.

³ https://dc-office.org/20210623_movie

Subject: Request to the U.S. Congress from the Okinawa Prefecture Government
From: Okinawa Prefecture <office@pref.okinawa.dc-office.org>
Date: 6/24/2021, 1:14 PM
To: paul.arcangeli@mail.house.gov

Dear Mr. Paul Arcangeli,

This is Satoshi Uechi of the Okinawa Prefecture Government Washington DC office. I hope that you are staying safe and healthy.

Please see the attached document regarding the Okinawa Prefectural Government's requests to the U.S. Congress.

Japan and the United States signed an agreement called "the Aircraft Noise Abatement Countermeasures at Futenma Air Station" in 1996 to address the concerns over U.S. military aircraft's noise level raised by the local community in Okinawa. The agreement dictates that U.S. military aircraft entering to and exiting from Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) should avoid flying over densely populated areas as much as possible, including hospitals and schools.

However, there has been repeated evidence that such aircrafts are flying over a nearby nursery school, and it continues to make local residents worried. The Okinawa Prefectural Government is hereby requesting that the U.S. Congress act to ensure that the U.S. military strictly adheres to the agreed countermeasures and takes the local community's voices seriously.

Please don't hesitate to email me at office@pref.okinawa.dc-office.org if you have any questions or would like to further discuss our requests.

Thank you very much for your kind time and attention.

Sincerely,

Satoshi Uechi
Director
Okinawa Prefecture Washington D.C. Office

Attachments:

20210624_OPG_request-2.pdf

156 KB

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1.1.2 親環立承認申請の概要

(1) 護岸等の構造の概要

親環立承認申請の「提出図書2 設計概要図(表裏)10-12」に記載されている代表的な護岸等の配置及び断面を図 1.1-5 図 1.1-6 に示す。







図 1.1-5 代表的な護岸等の配置及び断面(1)





本土復帰50年に向けた在沖米軍基地の
整理・縮小について（要請）

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令和3年5月

沖 縄 県

知 基 第 6 0 号
令和3年5月27日

駐日米国臨時代理大使
ジョセフ・M・ヤング 殿

沖縄県知事 玉 城 デ ニ ー

本土復帰50年に向けた在沖米軍基地の整理・縮小 について（要請）

沖縄県は、令和4年に本土復帰50年という大きな節目を迎えることとなります。この50年で沖縄県はめざましい発展を遂げることができました。人口は復帰時の96万人から146万人まで増加し^{*1}、県民総所得(名目)は5千億円から4兆7千億円^{*2}に、年間入域観光客数は56万人から947万人^{*3}に増加しています。インフラの整備も飛躍的に進み、モノレールの開通や多くの島々が橋で結ばれるなど、まさに隔世の感があります。

一方、米軍基地については、米軍専用施設面積が昭和47年の2万8千ヘクタールから現在の1万8千ヘクタールへと33.7パーセント減少したものの、依然として全国の70.3パーセントが本県に集中し、沖縄本島の実に14.6パーセントを占めています^{*4}。

太平洋戦争の際、沖縄に上陸した米軍は、住民を収容所に強制隔離し土地の強制接収を行い、新しい基地を建設していきました。さらに、太平洋戦争終結後も、米軍は、朝鮮戦争の勃発など国際情勢の変化や本土からの海兵隊移設に伴い、「銃剣とブルドーザー」で住民を追い出し、家を破壊し、田畑を潰して新たな基地を造っていきました。沖縄県民は、50年前、本土復帰によって米軍基地も「本土並み」になるものと期待しておりました。しかし、

*1 沖縄県「推計人口」昭和47年959,615人、令和2年9月1,458,730人

*2 沖縄県「県民経済計算」県民総所得(名目)昭和47年度5,013億円、平成29年度46,742億円

*3 沖縄県「入域観光客統計」年間入域観光客数 昭和47年度558,593人、令和元年度9,469,200人

*4 沖縄防衛局提供資料 在日米軍専用施設面積(令和2年3月31日現在)(P17図表1)
全国 263,067千㎡、沖縄 184,836千㎡(割合70.26%)

復帰前に建設された米軍基地の多くが、今でも沖縄に存在し続けています。

米軍基地が集中することにより、騒音、水質汚染等の環境問題、米軍関係の事件・事故は後を絶つことがありません。普天間飛行場、嘉手納飛行場及び訓練場の周辺住民は、昼夜を問わない訓練により、騒音や排気ガスの悪臭等に苦しめられ続けています。

また、米軍人等による凶悪事件は、平成7年には沖縄本島北部において在沖米海兵隊員3名が女子小学生を暴行する事件、平成28年にはうるま市において米軍軍属による女性暴行殺人事件、平成31年には北谷町において米海軍兵による女性殺人事件など痛ましい事件が発生しており、殺人、強盗、強姦といった凶悪事件は復帰後583件発生しています。

航空機事故も相次いでおり、平成16年に宜野湾市の沖縄国際大学への海兵隊CH-53Dヘリコプターの墜落事故、平成28年に名護市安部沿岸でのMV-22オスプレイの墜落事故、平成29年に東村高江の牧草地にCH-53Eヘリコプターが不時着炎上する事故及び宜野湾市の普天間第二小学校にCH-53Eヘリコプターが窓枠を落下させる事故が発生しています。これらの事故は、一歩間違えば県民の生命に関わる大変重大な事故です。

また、広大な米軍基地は沖縄経済をフリーズさせています。例えば、既に返還された駐留軍用地の跡地利用に伴う経済効果を試算すると、那覇新都心地区、小緑金城地区、桑江・北前地区の3地区合計では返還後の跡地利用により、返還前と比べて直接経済効果^{*5}が約28倍、雇用者数^{*6}が約72倍となっています。平成22年に返還されたキャンプ瑞慶覧アワセゴルフ場跡地においては、県内最大規模の商業施設や大型総合病院が建設され、同地区の県全体への経済波及効果は1年当たり約574億円^{*7}となっており、平成27年に返還されたキャンプ瑞慶覧西普天間住宅地区跡地では、沖縄健康医療拠点の形成に向けた整備が進められております。

沖縄県は、日米安全保障体制の必要性を理解する立場です。また、昨今の日本を取り巻く安全保障環境は、厳しさを増しているということは沖縄県も理解しております。しかし、沖縄の基地負担の状況は異常であり、到底受忍できるものではありません。

沖縄県が本土復帰50年という大きな節目を迎えるに当たり、目に見える形で沖縄の過重な基地負担の解消を図っていただく必要があります。

*5 沖縄県「駐留軍用地跡地利用に伴う経済波及効果等に関する検討調査(平成27年1月)」

*6 沖縄県「沖縄の米軍及び自衛隊基地(統計資料)」、「経済センサス活動調査(II24)」

*7 泡瀬土地区画整理組合による試算

沖縄県では、令和元年度及び2年度に「米軍基地問題に関する万国津梁会議」という専門家会議を設置し、「在沖米軍基地の整理・縮小」をテーマに議論していただき、以下の提言を受けました。^{*8}

- 1 辺野古新基地計画は完成が困難であり、本来の目的である普天間飛行場の速やかな危険性除去と運川停止を可能にする方策を早急に具体化すべき。
- 2 近年の安全保障環境を踏まえて沖縄米軍基地の整理・縮小に取り組むべき。
- 3 沖縄はアジア太平洋における緊張緩和・信頼醸成のための結節点を目指すべき。

また、同会議は、「沖縄への米軍基地の集中は、政治的には沖縄県民の反発の高まりによって、また軍事的には中国などのミサイル能力の向上によって、ますます脆弱になっている。海兵隊を含めた米軍自身も、中国のミサイルの脅威に対応するべく、部隊の分散化を進めている。日米同盟が安定的に維持されるためにも、沖縄への米軍基地の集中を是正し、日本全体・アジア全体の視野に立って安全保障の負担のあり方を見直すべきである。」^{*9}としています。

特に海兵隊の新たな戦略である遠征前方基地作戦(EABO)については、「海兵隊は分散された小規模な兵力で重要な位置にある離島などに一時的な拠点を構築することが目指されている。」「海兵隊は、EABOを推進するに当たり、「潜在敵国が米国の固定的で脆弱な基地を標的にしようとする」のに対し、「集中した、脆弱な、そしてお金のかかる前方のインフラやプラットフォームに依存しない新しい遠征型の海軍力の構造を発展させる」ことを目指している。」^{*10}としております。

このように、同会議の提言は、沖縄県のこれまでの主張を単に肯定したのではなく、「軍事的合理性も重視しつつ、それが沖縄米軍基地の整理・縮小と両立しうる道筋を探った」ものです。

本要請も、日米安全保障体制の維持を前提としています。

沖縄県としては、バイデン新政権は、同盟国の協力を重視するものと承知

*8 「在沖米軍基地の整理・縮小についての提言」(令和2年3月 米軍基地問題に関する万国津梁会議) P1、P11

*9 「在沖米軍基地の整理・縮小についての提言」(令和2年3月 米軍基地問題に関する万国津梁会議) P19

*10 「在沖米軍基地の整理・縮小についての提言」(令和2年3月 米軍基地問題に関する万国津梁会議) P8、P19 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Commandant's Planning Guidance*, 2019.

しております。米中の緊張緩和の必要性、沖縄の基地負担の軽減を求める日本の主張に真摯に耳を傾けていただけるものと期待しております。

日米両政府におかれては、本土復帰50年という大きな節目を迎えるに当たり、在沖米軍基地の1層の整理・縮小、負担軽減に取り組んでいただきますよう要請いたします。

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1 在沖米軍基地の整理・縮小について

要 請

- (1) 在沖米軍基地の整理・縮小を一層進めること。整理・縮小を行うに当たっては、沖縄21世紀ビジョンにおいて「基地のない平和で豊かな沖縄」をあるべき県土の姿としていること、沖縄県議会において繰り返し「海兵隊の撤退」が決議された経緯を踏まえ、「在沖海兵隊の段階的な整理・縮小等、当面は在日米軍専用施設面積の50パーセント以下を目指す」とする具体的な数値目標を日米両政府の協議で設定し、実現すること。
- (2) 特に、普天間飛行場の県外、国外移設及び早期返還に取り組むとともに、県民の理解が得られない辺野古新基地建設を断念すること。
- (3) 在沖米軍基地の整理・縮小と併せて、駐留軍等労働者への影響が最小限になるような雇用対策を行うこと。

説 明

(1) 基地の整理・縮小

冒頭中し上げたように、沖縄県は、日米安全保障体制の必要性を理解する立場です。しかしながら、在日米軍兵力の本県への集中は、日本全国の中で明らかに不公平であり、応分の負担をはるかに超えております。都道府県ごとの米軍専用施設面積の割合をみると、沖縄県の70.3パーセントに対し、次に割合の高い青森県が9.0パーセント、神奈川県が5.6パーセント、東京都が5.0パーセントであり、沖縄県の過重負担は明らかであります。^{*11}

広大な米軍基地は、日常的に発生する航空の騒音や排気ガスの悪臭をはじめ、実弾射撃演習による原野火災や自然環境の破壊、油類による河川、海域及び土壌の汚染、航空機事故のほか、米軍人等による刑法犯罪等の発生など様々、県民生活に様々な影響を及ぼしています。

海兵隊の訓練を県外・国外へ移転することを含め、在沖米軍兵力の削減を図ることは、沖縄の過重な基地負担の軽減及び米軍人等による事件・事故の減少にもつながるものであり、「再編実施のための日米のロードマップ」及び「沖縄における在日米軍施設・区域に関する統合計画」に基づく在沖海兵隊約9千人の国外移転を確実に実施するよう強く求め

*11 沖縄防衛局提供資料から試算（P17図表2，3）

ます。

また、同計画に基づく嘉手納飛行場より南の施設・区域の返還についても、将来の在沖米軍基地の在り方に大きな影響を与えるとともに、沖縄の振興発展の将来を左右する大きな転機になることから、確実に実施される必要があります。

しかし、SACO最終報告における在沖米軍基地の整理・縮小や統合計画に基づく嘉手納飛行場より南の施設の返還においては、その機能が沖縄県内に移設されることが条件となっていることから、普天間飛行場の辺野古崎への移設のように多くの県民が望まない移設が進められたり、また、北部訓練場の過半の返還においては東村高江集落の周辺にヘリパッドが集中することとなり、激しい騒音が発生するなどの問題が起こっております。このため、今後、在沖米軍基地の整理・縮小を検討するに当たっては、沖縄県外への移設を前提とする必要があります。

また、同計画による返還が全て実施されたとしても沖縄の米軍専用施設面積は、全国の69パーセント程度^{*12}にとどまり、応分の負担には依然としてほど遠い状況にあることから、更なる返還が必要であると考えております。

日米両政府は、中国のミサイル能力の向上とそれに伴う米軍基地の脆弱化といったアジア太平洋における近年の安全保障環境の変化を踏まえても、米軍の兵力構成や基地の在り方を柔軟に再検討し、在沖米軍基地の整理・縮小を加速させるべきであります。^{*13}

さらに、沖縄県は沖縄21世紀ビジョンにおいて「基地のない平和で豊かな沖縄をあるべき県上の姿としながら、引き続き基地の整理・縮小を進める」としていること、沖縄県議会においては、繰り返し「在沖米海兵隊の撤退を図ること」を決議していることなどを重く受け止めるべきであります。

このようなことから、米軍基地の整理・縮小を行うに当たっては、新たな在沖米軍の整理・縮小のためのロードマップを策定し、「在沖海兵隊の段階的な整理・縮小等、当面は在日米軍専用施設面積の50パーセント以下を目指す」とする具体的な数値目標を日米両政府において設定す

*12 沖縄防衛局提供資料から試算

在日米軍施設・区域（専用施設）面積

令和2年現在 全国 26,307ha、沖縄県18,484ha(70.3%)

統合計画完了後 全国 25,382ha、沖縄県17,559ha(69.2%)

普天間飛行場の返還は、県内移設を伴わないものとして試算

*13 「在沖米軍基地の整理・縮小についての提言」（令和2年3月 米軍基地問題に関する万国津梁会議）^{「ii}

る必要があります。その数値目標の設定に当たっては、沖縄県の意見を十分反映させることによって、県民が納得できるものにする必要があります。

さらに、北部訓練場に所在する福地ダム、新川ダム及びキャンプ・ハンセンに所在する漢那ダムについては、日米地位協定第2条第4項(b)により米軍が使用することが可能な状態となっております。これらのダムにおいては、昭和63年以降訓練が行われておりませんが、水源となっているダムで訓練を行うことは、県民に不安を与えるものであり、米軍による共同使用の解除を求めます。

(2) 普天間飛行場の早期返還、辺野古新基地建設断念

普天間飛行場は、市街地の中心部に位置しており、住民生活に著しい影響を与えていることから、周辺住民の航空機事故への不安や騒音被害などを解消することが喫緊の課題となっており、危険性の除去及び同飛行場の早期返還は県民の強い願いであります。しかしながら、近年、外来機の飛来増加などによって、同飛行場における航空機の離着陸回数は増加しており¹⁴、周辺住民は依然として大きな負担を強いられております。

辺野古新基地建設に反対する県民の民意は、過去2回の知事選挙をはじめ、参議院議員選挙、衆議院議員選挙など、一連の選挙において揺るぎない形で示され続けております。平成31年2月に行われた県民投票¹⁵においても、辺野古埋め立て反対の民意が圧倒的多数で明確に示されたことは、極めて重いものであります。

防衛省は、辺野古新基地建設について、統合計画に示されている提供手続の完了までに要する期間が約12年になると公表しており、沖縄県としては、辺野古移設では、普天間飛行場の一日も早い危険性の除去につ

*14 「普天間飛行場離発着状況」(沖縄防衛局提供資料)(P19図表4)

平成29年度 常駐機13,166機、外来機415機、合計13,581機

平成30年度 常駐機14,576機、外来機1,756機、合計16,332機

令和元年度 常駐機14,072機、外来機2,776機、合計16,848機

令和2年度 常駐機16,380機、外来機2,590機、合計18,970機

*15 「辺野古米軍基地建設のための埋め立ての賛否を問う県民投票」(平成31年2月24日投票)

投票率 52.48%

賛成 114,933票(19.0%) 反対 434,273票(71.7%) どちらでもない 52,682票(8.7%)

無効投票数 3,497票(0.6%)

()は投票総数に占める割合

ながらないことが明確になったものと考えております。

また、防衛省は、総工費が約9,300億円になることも公表していますが、今回公表された総工費は現時点での検討を踏まえたもので、今後、さらに、工期が延び、総工費が膨れ上がる可能性があります。

仮に、辺野古新基地を十数年もかけて完成させたとしても、軟弱地盤の影響により、不同沈下が起きることは専門家も指摘^{*16}するところであり、そうすると基地機能の維持にも膨大な予算を要することとなり、却って米国の信頼を著しく損なう事態になるのではないかと考えております。

辺野古新基地計画はもはや「唯一の解決策」にはなり得ず、完成すら困難であり、民主主義や環境破壊のみならず、財政や安全保障の観点から見ても現行案のような「大規模で恒久的な新基地建設」は合理的ではなく、新たな打開策を見いだすことが日本全体、また日米同盟にとっても有益であります。

日米両政府は、辺野古新基地建設計画を見直し、辺野古移設を前提とすることなく、本来の目的である普天間飛行場の速やかな危険性の除去と運用停止を可能にする方策を見いだすべきであります。

(3) 駐留軍等労働者対策

駐留軍等労働者は、在日米軍の安定的な駐留、円滑かつ効果的な運用を支え、日米安全保障体制を維持する上で大きく寄与しており、本県には、駐留軍等労働者全体の約35パーセントを占める約9千人がおります。

基地で雇用されている従業員等の職場環境の改善や雇用の安定に努めるなど、基地従業員に対する日本政府の取組への協力をお願いいたします。

*16 日本大学鎌尾章司准教授等の指摘

2 基地負担の軽減について

要 請

- (1) 在沖米軍の県外又は国外への分散移転・ローテーション配備をより一層促進すること。
- (2) 特に、普天間飛行場については、一日も早い危険性の除去を図るため、直ちに、所属機の分散移転・ローテーション配備を行うこと。
- (3) オスプレイの配備を撤回すること。
- (4) 訓練場の能力を超える訓練を廃止すること。
- (5) 米軍基地の運用の変更については、沖縄の基地負担の増加につながることは絶対に避けること。
- (6) 嘉手納飛行場、普天間飛行場等における航空機の騒音や排気ガスの悪臭の軽減を図ること。また、米軍の活動に起因する環境問題の解決を図ること。

説 明

(1) 分散移転・ローテーション配備

米軍基地の運用に伴う航空機騒音や環境汚染等の様々な問題を解決するためには、米軍基地の整理・縮小とともに、県外又は国外への分散移転・ローテーション配備など地元が負担軽減を実感できる取り組みが重要であります。

分散移転等については、アジア太平洋の安全保障環境の変化に伴い、米軍の戦略が「集中から分散」^{*17}へと大きく変化している状況を勘案すると、米国側の理解も得られると思料しています。現に第38代米海兵隊総司令官バーガー大將は、「海兵隊はインド太平洋の部隊を分散しなければならない」^{*18}などと繰り返し述べていると承知しています。

平成9年まで沖縄県で実施されていた県道104号線越え実弾砲撃演習の本土への訓練移転については、複数の自衛隊基地で訓練が行われることにより、地元への影響も分散されていると承知しております。このこ

*17 2020NDAA第1253条報告書 デビッドソンインド太平洋軍総司令官は「潜在的な敵のミサイル攻撃能力に対し非常に脆弱な大規模で集中型の基地に物理的に軍隊を集中させることは戦略として賢明ではなく、運用的にも実行不可能である…統合部隊のローテーションによる前方配備こそが、米国のコミットメントを示し、潜在的な敵の攻撃へ対処し、同盟国や協力国の理解を得ることを同時に成立させる、最も信頼性の高い方法だ。」としている。

*18 米海軍研究所ニュース电子版(2020.9.24)バーガー海兵隊総司令官は、「今後数十年間中国の攻撃に対する抑止を成功させたいなら、海兵隊はインド太平洋地域の部隊を分散しなければならない。」と発言した。

とから、本土への分散移転・ローテーション配備に当たっては、米軍専用施設と比較して、日本政府が米軍の運用に責任を持つことにより地元への影響を軽減できる自衛隊基地の米軍との共同使用を含め検討していただきたいと考えております。

また、海兵隊の海外でのローテーション配備について、既に実施しているオーストラリアに加え、フィリピンなど他のアジア太平洋地域諸国に展開することは、在沖米軍基地の整理・縮小を行う上でも大変重要であると認識しております。

(2) 普天間飛行場の危険性除去

普天間飛行場の危険性の除去は喫緊の課題であります。同飛行場所属機は、平成16年に沖縄国際大学への墜落事故、平成29年に緑ヶ丘保育園の屋根に部品が落下したとみられる事案及び普天間第二小学校の校庭に窓枠を落下させる事故、令和元年に浦西中学校に部品を落下させる事故を起こしています。これらの事故は、一步間違えば県民の生命に関わる重大な事故につながりかねず、日米両政府には、最悪の事態が起こる前に、一日も早い危険性の除去に取り組んでいただく必要があります。

(3) オスプレイ配備撤回

普天間飛行場所属のMV-22オスプレイは、平成28年に名護市安部沿岸で墜落事故を起こしたほか、緊急着陸を繰り返しています。

こうした事案が発生する度に沖縄県や関係自治体などから原因の究明や公表、原因究明までの飛行中止などを求めてきたにもかかわらず、十分な説明がないまま飛行を続け、同様の事案を繰り返し発生させている米軍及びそれを容認し続ける日本政府の姿勢に怒りを禁じ得ません。

沖縄県は、オスプレイ配備に反対であり、オスプレイの配備撤回とともに、訓練移転や県外配備の早期実施など、実効性のある負担軽減措置を講ずるよう要請します。

(4) 訓練場の能力を超える訓練

平成30年、キャンプシュワブ演習場レンジ10から発射された50口径弾が、名護市数久田にある農作業小屋の窓ガラスを貫通する事故が発生するなど、流弾事故は復帰後約30件発生しています。米軍による流弾事故は、射程距離の長い重機関銃によるものが多く、射程距離より小さい演習場での訓練の在り方に疑問が持たれています。

また、令和元年には、キャンプ・ハンセンで実施されていた訓練で使
用された照明弾が、金武町の民間地に落下する事故が発生しており、地
元自治体は住宅地付近における訓練の恒久的中止を要請しております。

さらに、津堅島訓練水域におけるパラシュート降下訓練は、同水域が
定期船や漁船などが航行する水域での訓練であり、過去には、訓練水域
外の津堅島の南の防波堤の近くに降下する事故も発生したこともあり、
一歩間違えれば重大な事故に繋がる訓練であることから、地元から訓練
中止の要請があります。

沖縄の米軍の訓練場は、住民が生活する地域と隣接しているため、事
故が発生した場合、県民の生命・財産に関わる大きな事故につながる可
能性が高く、このため、訓練場の能力を超える訓練については、廃止す
るべきであります。

米会計検査院などは、沖縄は演習場として狭く市街地に近いため、海
兵隊の訓練に制約となっていると報告しており^{*19}、米軍の運用上も県外
・国外の広い訓練場を利用することが求められていると考えておりま
す。

さらに、伊江島で行われているパラシュート降下訓練について、平成
19年の日米合同委員会において「例外的な場合」に限り嘉手納飛行場を使
用することが合意されたことから、これまで同訓練が嘉手納飛行場にお
いて繰り返し実施されております。しかし、どのような場合が「例外的
な場合」に当たるか明確にされておらず、しかも日本政府が「例外的な場
合」に当たらないとして訓練の中止を要請したにもかかわらず、訓練が
実施されるという事案も度々発生しております。

嘉手納飛行場におけるパラシュート降下訓練は、SACO最終報告の趣旨
に沿って厳格に運用されるべきであり、平成19年の日米合同委員会の合
意を廃止し、嘉手納飛行場での同訓練を中止すべきであります。

(5) 基地の運用の変更

米国がアジアに配備を計画しているとされる中距離ミサイルについて

*19 「在沖米軍基地の整理・縮小についての提言」(令和2年3月 米軍基地問題に関する万国津梁会
議) P17 United States General Accounting office, *Military Training Limitation Exist Over
seas but Are Not Reflected in Readiness Reporting*, 2002, p.7; Marine Corps Installations
Pacific, *2025 Strategic Vision*, p.9.

も、米側は沖縄への配備については現時点において計画はない^{*20}としておりますが、沖縄県への配備が計画された場合は、新たな基地負担となり、県民の平穏な日常生活が不安にさらされることとなることから、断固反対いたします。万が一これが現実に計画された場合、県民の反発が日米安全保障体制の維持に大きな影響を与えることは自明であります。

また、米国の報道によると、米海兵隊バーガー総司令官は、2027年までに「海兵隊沿岸連隊」を沖縄に配備するとしております。^{*21}同部隊の沖縄配備により兵員数の増加はないとされておりますが、海兵隊の再編により基地負担の増加につながることは、あつてはならないと考えております。

(6) 騒音対策、環境対策

米軍の運用が周辺地域に与える影響は多岐にわたっていますが、とりわけ住宅地域に隣接する嘉手納飛行場及び普天間飛行場を離発着する航空機による騒音や排気ガスの悪臭は、地域住民の生活環境に深刻な影響を与えています。

両飛行場においては、米軍再編に伴う訓練の一部移転が実施されておりますが、目に見える効果が現れておらず、依然として負担軽減が図られていない状況であることから、継続的に訓練移転による負担軽減の効果の検証を行い、当該結果を踏まえ、早急に具体的、かつ、実効性のある対応策を講じていただく必要があります。また、県外・国外への分散移転・ローテーション配備や外来機の飛来制限など地元が負担軽減を実感できる取り組みを併せて行っていただく必要があります。

さらに、LHDデッキの改修後、騒音が激しくなっている伊江島補助飛行場における騒音対策をはじめ、本島内の訓練場周辺地域においても騒音被害が日常化している北部訓練場のN-1地区、キャンプ・シュワブのフェニックス、ガンダ、キャンプ・ハンセンのファルコン等のヘリコプター着陸帯の使用中止、住宅地上空の飛行の回避、夜間の訓練飛行の制限等の措置を講じていただく必要があります。

嘉手納飛行場、普天間飛行場等の周辺において高濃度で検出された有機フッ素化合物（PFOS等）については、安全な水道水の確保等を図るた

*20 令和元年10月知事訪米の際、米国防総省東アジア担当部長に確認

*21 米連邦議会調査局報告書「海兵隊再編イニシアチブ」(2020.5)。ロイター通信電子版(2020.7.23) バーガー海兵隊総司令官が海兵沿岸連隊を2027年までに沖縄に創設すべく日本政府との協議を開始したことを明らかにしたとする報道。

め、使用の禁止、代替品への早期交換を行うとともに、発生源特定のための調査等の措置を講じていただく必要があります。

その他、米軍が使用したアスベスト含有建材の適切な処理、オスプレイ等の飛行に伴う低周波音による影響の実態調査、米軍航空機の排気ガスによる悪臭の防止対策等、米軍の活動に起因する環境問題について、適切な対策を講じていただく必要があります。

3 訓練水域・空域の削減について

要 請

沖縄本島周辺の訓練水域・空域について、大幅な削減を行うとともに、臨時訓練空域の有無や使用実態を明らかにすること。

説 明

沖縄本島の周辺では、27か所の訓練水域と20か所の訓練空域が米軍に提供されており、訓練水域の面積は5万5千平方キロメートルで日本全体の訓練水域の実に約71パーセントが沖縄本島周辺に存在しています。^{*22}また、訓練空域は約9万5千平方キロメートルに及び北海道の面積の約1.1倍に相当する広大なものであります。さらに、訓練空域に加え、近年、「アルトラブ」と呼ばれる米軍の臨時訓練空域が新たに設定され、実質的に訓練空域が拡大していることが指摘されています。

嘉手納飛行場及び普天間飛行場における離発着回数の合計は、令和2年度約6万7千回で、うち約1万4千回、約20パーセントは外来機による使用となっています。^{*23}

例えば、普天間飛行場から岩国飛行場へ移転されたKC-130空中給油機は、岩国周辺に十分な訓練場所がないため、結局沖縄に戻って訓練を行っている^{*24}とされているように、外来機の多くは沖縄近海に存在する広大な訓練水域・空域における訓練が目的であると考えられます。

また、沖縄周辺の広大な米軍提供水域によって、漁場が制限されるとともに、漁場間の移動に大きな制約を受けております。例えば、ホテル・ホテル訓練区域及びその周辺の沖縄本島に接近した海域は、カツオやマグロ、ソデイカの好漁場であり、鳥島射爆撃場及び久米島射爆撃場周辺の海域は、パヤオ漁業が盛んであるとともに、もずく養殖場が隣接していますが、米軍提供水域によって大きな制約を受けております。

これらのことから、沖縄周辺の訓練水域・空域の大幅な削減を行うとと

*22 沖縄防衛局提供資料（P18図表5）

訓練水域 沖縄周辺54,938km²、日本周辺77,000km²(71.3%)

訓練空域 沖縄周辺95,416km²

*23 沖縄防衛局提供資料(令和2年度航空機の離着陸等状況)（P20図表6）

嘉手納飛行場 常駐機36,825回、外来機11,061回(外来機割合23.1%)

普天間飛行場 常駐機16,380回、外来機2,590回(外来機割合13.7%)

*24 「在沖米軍基地の整理・縮小についての提言」（令和2年3月 米軍基地問題に関する万国津梁会議）P6 United States General Accounting Office, *Marine Corps Asia Pacific Realignment: DOD Should resolve Capability Deficiencies and Infrastructure Risks and Revise Cost Estimates*, April, 2017, p.19.

もに、臨時訓練空域の有無や使用実態を明らかにする必要があります。

加えて、米軍機が嘉手納飛行場及び普天間飛行場に優先的に着陸するために、「アライバル・セクター」と言われる米軍優先空域が設定されているとのことであり、那覇空港に離着陸する民間機の飛行高度が1,200フィート(約360メートル)以下の低高度に制限される管制業務上の措置が執られております。

今後、増大する航空需要への対応や航空交通の安全性や安定性を確保するため、沖縄周辺空域の航空管制の見直しや航空ルート拡大を検討していただきたいと考えております。

また、令和2年12月末から令和3年1月にかけて3回にわたり延べ11機の米軍機が座間味村及び渡嘉敷村周辺において、同年2月には国頭村辺戸岬周辺において低空飛行訓練を行っております。提供施設・区域外の訓練は、地域住民に強い不安を与えることから、提供施設・区域外における訓練を実施しないことを強く求めます。

4 日米地位協定の抜本的な見直しについて

要 請

早急に日米地位協定の見直しを行うこと。

説 明

日米地位協定は、一度も改正されないまま締結から60年近くが経過しており、人権や環境問題に対する意識の高まり等の中で、時代の要求や国民の要望にそぐわないものとなっており、沖縄県はこれまで3度にわたりその見直しを訴えております。

沖縄県が行った他国地位協定調査の結果、NATOに加盟するドイツ、イタリア、ベルギー、イギリスや米軍を訪問軍として受け入れるフィリピン、オーストラリアにおいては、航空法など自国の法律や規則を米軍にも適用させ、米軍の活動をコントロールしていることが明らかになりました。日米両政府は、米国と地位協定を締結している他国の状況を踏まえ、日本国民の生命や財産を守るという観点から、日米地位協定の見直しに取り組んでいただきたいと考えております。

世界規模でのコロナ禍において、令和2年、普天間飛行場及びキャンプ・ハンセンにおいて発生した大規模感染は、日米地位協定によって、米軍に国内法が適用されないことが大きな原因の一つであると考えております。今回露呈した検疫に関する問題をはじめ、日米地位協定については、早急に見直しを行っていただく必要があります。

また、在沖米軍の県外への分散移転・ローテーション配備を行うに当たって、米軍が訓練を行う時間や種類など具体的な使用内容について、地元自治体と政府において「米軍の演習場使用に関する協定」を締結することは、地元の不安解消のために重要であります。

さらに、嘉手納町など基地所在市町村から、多発する基地被害の軽減を図るため、米軍専用施設における使用協定締結の要望があること等を踏まえ、日米両政府には地元の意向を踏まえ使用協定の締結を検討していただきたいと考えております。

5 更なる在沖米軍基地の整理・縮小に向けての協議について

要 請

- (1) 「再編実施のための日米ロードマップ」に続く在沖米軍基地の整理・縮小について、次期日米防衛政策見直し協議(DPRI)や日米安全保障協議委員会(2+2)等で積極的な協議を行うこと。
その際、日米両政府に沖縄県を加えた3者で協議を行う場(SACWO: SACO with Okinawa)を設けること。
- (2) 日本、米国、沖縄の有識者からなる専門家会合(トラック2)を設置し、普天間飛行場の早期の危険性除去・運用停止の実現や在沖米軍基地の大幅な整理・縮小について議論を行うこと。

説 明

(1) 日米両政府における協議

在沖米軍基地の整理・縮小については、近年のアジア太平洋地域における安全保障環境の変化や米軍の戦略を踏まえても実行可能であり、日米安全保障体制の維持やアジア地域の安定のためにも有益であると考えております。

日米両政府は、沖縄県の意見を建設的な意見と捉え、次期DPRIや2+2等において積極的な協議を行っていただきたいと考えております。

平成8年のSACO最終報告や平成25年の「沖縄における在日米軍施設・区域に関する統合計画」においては、計画の決定に沖縄県や地元市町村が関与できなかったため、地元の意向が十分反映されませんでした。このため、SACO以降の基地の整理・縮小の検証及び今後の沖縄の負担軽減策の検討のため、日米両政府に沖縄県を加えた3者で協議を行う場(SACWO)を設けていただきたいと考えております。

(2) トラック2

アジアの安全保障環境は、中国が軍事力を増強するとともに海洋進出を活発化させ、さらに短距離ミサイルや巡航ミサイルなどにより、接近阻止・領域拒否(A2AD)能力を向上させており、北朝鮮も核・ミサイル開発を続けるなど、パワーバランスの変化によって不確実性を増していると承知しております。

米軍の戦略も中国に対抗するため、「マルチ・ドメイン・オペレーション」の策定や「遠征前方基地作戦(EABO)」という新たな作戦を構想す

るなど大きく変化しようとしております。^{*25}

このような、安全保障環境の大きな変化の中で、普天間飛行場の早期の危険性除去・運用停止や在沖米軍基地の大幅な整理・縮小を図るためには、日本、米国及び沖縄の民間有識者による知的対話の場、いわゆる「トラック2」を設け、情勢分析や新たな政策提言を行うなど、これまでの考えに囚われない新たな視点での議論の枠組みが有効であると考えております。

そして、それが「トラック1」である政府間協議の場で実現されるというプロセスが重要であり、在沖米軍基地の整理・縮小についての、よりスムーズな議論につながると考えております。

*25 「在沖米軍基地の整理・縮小についての提言」（令和2年3月 米軍基地問題に関する万国津梁会議）P12

6 アジアにおける緊張緩和と信頼醸成について

要 請

- (1) アジア太平洋地域におけるさらなる発展と安定を維持するために、抑止力の強化だけでなく、域内における緊張緩和と信頼醸成に努めること。
- (2) アジア太平洋地域における沖縄県の地域協力ネットワーク構築に関する取組を支援すること。

説 明

(1) アジア太平洋地域における対話

アジア太平洋地域には、安全保障面における緊張関係と経済面における緊密な結びつきという2つの特徴が併存しています。沖縄は広大な米軍基地の存在だけでなく、尖閣諸島を巡る問題においても安全保障問題の最前線にいるといえます。

一方、アジア各国の経済成長と所得向上を背景に沖縄には多くの観光客が訪れるなど、経済的なつながりは強くなっております。

日米両政府は、アジア太平洋地域におけるさらなる発展と安定を維持するために、抑止力の強化だけでなく、域内における緊張緩和と信頼醸成を促進することを目指すべきであります。

(2) 沖縄県の地域協力ネットワーク構築に関する取組

沖縄は、日本本土、中国、朝鮮半島、台湾、東南アジアの中央に位置するという地理的特性を生かし、琉球王国時代はこれらの国々との交易を通して、人と文化の架け橋すなわち「万国津梁」となることを目指していました。

しかし、76年前の第二次大戦では、住民を巻き込んだ日本で唯一の地上戦の舞台となり、一般県民約10万人を含む20万人余の人々が犠牲になりました。その後27年間、日本本土と切り離され米軍の施政権下となり、米軍は1950年代には、「銃剣とブルドーザー」といわれる強制的な土地の接收により、米軍基地を拡張していきました。現在でも広大な米軍基地は沖縄に存在し続けています。

一方、現在では観光、経済、文化、平和など様々な分野でアジア各国との交流を行うようになりました。

沖縄県は、これまでの歴史や地理的特性を生かすことによって、軍事面での安全保障ではなく、幅広い分野において我が国とアジア太平洋地域との交流や信頼関係の構築など積極的な役割を担うことができると確


信しております。

沖縄県としましては、これまでの交流に加え、広島・長崎との連携を深めるとともに、今後は地域の安全保障や軍縮、海洋問題、災害支援、「人間の安全保障」（環境や医療、人権問題等）についても、対話の場になりたいと考えております。

米中対立の長期化に伴い、アジア太平洋地域において信頼醸成ネットワークを構築することは、日米両国にとって喫緊の課題であると認識しております。沖縄を地域の信頼醸成ネットワークのハブとすることは、日本全体にとっても経済と安全保障の両面で大きなメリットがあると考えております。

日米両政府におかれては、沖縄が「アジア太平洋における地域協力ネットワークのハブ（結節点）」となるよう、積極的な支援を行っていただきたいと考えております。

図表1 沖縄県と本土の米軍専用施設面積と沖縄県が占める割合の推移




沖縄防衛局提供資料により作成

図表2 米軍専用施設都道府県別面積割合




沖縄防衛局提供資料により作成

図表3 米軍専用施設面積が各都道府県面積に占める割合




沖縄防衛局提供資料により作成

図表4 離普天間飛行場 離発着状況と
外来機割合




沖縄防衛局提供資料（令和元年度航空機の離着陸状況）により作成

図表5 沖縄県周辺の訓練水域・空域の状況



赤の枠は琉球政府時代の行政区域

訓練水域・空域については、上記地図に記載されているもののほか、住民居住区域に隣接する形で、北部訓練場（国頭村）、キャンプ・シュワブ（名護市）、キャンプ・ハンセン（宜野湾市）、会武レッドビーチ、金武ブルービーチ（金武町）、天願橋橋、キャンプ・コートニー、ホワイト・ビーチ地区、陸軍貯油施設、伊原島訓練場、津堅島訓練場（うるま市）、泡瀬通信施設（沖縄市）などがある。



沖縄防衛局提供資料（令和元年度航空機の離着陸等状況）により作成

To: Mr. Joseph M. Young,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo

From: Denny Tamaki, Governor of Okinawa

Rc: Requests

Consolidation and Reduction of the US Military Bases on Okinawa
Toward the 50th Anniversary of Reversion of Okinawa to Japan

May 27, 2021

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Ref. No.60

May 27, 2021

To: Mr. Joseph M. Young,

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo

From: Denny Tamaki, Governor of Okinawa

Request: Consolidation and reduction of the U.S. military bases on Okinawa toward the 50th anniversary of reversion of Okinawa to Japan.

Okinawa Prefecture will be honoring the 50th anniversary of reversion to Japan in 2022, a historic landmark. Okinawa has witnessed remarkable progress over the past five decades: the population of Okinawa has skyrocketed from 960,000 in 1972 to 1.46 million in 2020¹, the Okinawa's nominal total gross income has increased from ¥ 500 billion in 1972 to ¥ 4.7 trillion in 2017² and the number of incoming tourists has soared to 9.47 million in 2019 from 560,000 in 1972³. The rollout of infrastructure has progressed exponentially: the opening of the monorail; and the bridging of lots of isolated islets to name a few. Okinawa has truly made a sea change.

On the other hand, although the land exclusively used by the U.S. military in Okinawa has decreased by 33.7 percent from 28,000 hectares in 1972 to 18,000 hectares at present, Okinawa-based U.S. military bases yet account for a staggering 14.6 percent of Okinawa Main Island with 70.3 percent of the U.S. military bases in Japan still concentrated on Okinawa.⁴

During World War II the U.S. military landed on Okinawa, quarantined many local Okinawans in concentration camps, and expropriated their vast stretches of land in order to build military bases. Further, even after World War II, faced with the sea change in international affairs precipitated by the outbreak of the Korean War and the influx of a large number of U.S. Marines into Okinawa from the mainland Japan, the U.S. military forced out quite a few local residents by employing what is called *bayonets and bulldozer*, demolished their homes, and destroyed rice fields and vegetable fields in order to build their military bases. Half a century ago, people in Okinawa had hoped that the concentration of military bases and facilities in Okinawa would taper off to a comparable level as that of the mainland Japan. On the contrary most of these U.S. military bases, which had been built before the reversion in 1972, still continue to exist on Okinawa.

¹ Okinawa Prefecture, "Estimated Population": 959,615 in 1972; 1,458,730 in September 2020, Okinawa

² Okinawa Prefecture, "The Calculation of Okinawa Prefectural Residents' Economy": Nominal Total Gross Income: ¥ 501.3 billion in 1972; ¥ 4,674.2 trillion in 2017, Okinawa

³ Okinawa Prefecture, "Statistics on the Number of Incoming Tourists": 558,593 in 1972; 9,469,200 in 2019, Okinawa

⁴ Some Archives Provided by Okinawa Defense Bureau: "Area Exclusively Used by the USFJ" (as of March 31, 2020), see p.19, chart 1: Japan, 263,067,000 m²; Okinawa, 184,876,000 m² (Percentage 70.26%)

The concentration of the U.S. military bases on Okinawa has caused negative externalities, or perennial problems: noise pollution; environmental destruction such as water contamination; accidents and incidents caused by U.S. military personnel. The local residents in the vicinities of Kadena Air Base, Futenma Air Base and other military training facilities have been suffering from noise pollution, gas emissions (odors) and others because of the U.S. military's training regardless of day and night.

Furthermore, there have been as many as 583 heinous crimes by U.S. military service members and others (e.g., civilian component, contractors) such as homicides, robberies, rapes since Okinawa was reverted to Japan in 1972: three U.S. Marines in Okinawa sexually assaulted a Japanese elementary school student in the northern part of Okinawa Main Island in 1995; an American (civilian component) assaulted and murdered a Japanese woman in Uruma City in 2016; and a U.S. Navy serviceman murdered a Japanese woman in Chatan Town in 2019.

We have had a number of aircraft accidents: a Marine's CH-53D helicopter crashed into Okinawa International University in Ginowan City in 2004; an MV-22 Osprey crashed into the sea off the coast of Abu in Nago City in 2016; a CH-53E helicopter made an emergency landing on the pasture and burst into flames in Higashi Village's Takae in 2017; and another CH-53E helicopter dropped a window frame onto Futenma Dai-Ni Elementary School in Ginowan City in the same year. One false step and these accidents would have been life-threatening disasters.

Furthermore, the expansive land exclusively used by the U.S. military on Okinawa has gotten in the way of Okinawa's economic development. For example, consider the economic effects derived from developing former U.S. military bases that have already been reverted to Okinawa — the Naha Shm Toshin district, the Oroku Kinjo district, the Kuwae-Kitamae district. The aggregate economic effects of these three districts combined have skyrocketed by a factor of 28 in terms of direct economic effects⁵ and 72 in terms of employment⁶, compared with the pre-reversion economic situation. Mega-projects — such as one of the biggest shopping malls in Okinawa, a large-scale general hospital — have been completed on what used to be Awase Meadows Golf Course in Camp Zukeran since it was reverted to Okinawa in 2010. The economic multiplier effect of this erstwhile golf course on Okinawa as a whole, on an annual basis, is some ¥57.4 billion.⁷ Moreover, construction is underway to transform what used to be the West Futenma Housing Area (in Camp Zukeran) into the center of healthcare service and public health in Okinawa.

⁵ Okinawa Prefecture (January, 2015). *"An Investigative Research on Economic Multiplier Effects and Others Derived from Using the Area Formerly Used by the US Military,"* Okinawa

⁶ Okinawa Prefecture, *"The USFJ on Okinawa and the SDF Bases(Statistics)"*; *"The Activities Research on Economic Census -2012,"* Okinawa

⁷ Calculation based on the *Association of Re-zoning in Awase*

OPG well understands the *raison d'être* for the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements: Okinawa is fully aware of the heightening tensions surrounding the Japan's security environment. However, Okinawa bears an outsized burden of hosting US military bases, which is very much off the spectrum and absolutely intolerable.

With the significant, fifty year landmark of Okinawa's reversion to Japan approaching, it is necessary that both the United States and Japan map out the plans – which will bring about tangible changes – for resolving the outsized military base burden on Okinawa.

In 2019 and 2020, OPG launched the *Bankoku Shinryo Council on the U.S. Military Base Issues*, a council consisted of experts; and OPG had them discuss the *consolidation and reduction of the U.S. military bases on Okinawa*⁸ as a topic. The council made the following proposals to OPG:

1. Constructing a new base in Henoko is difficult to complete. Thus the United States and Japan should promptly formulate a concrete policy to realize the principal objectives of eliminating the dangers of and suspending the operations of MCAS Futenma.
2. Taking into account the recent changes in the security environment, Tokyo and Washington should work on the consolidation and reduction of the U.S. military bases on Okinawa.
3. Okinawa should aspire to be a hub in terms of reducing tensions and building confidence within the Asia-Pacific region.

Furthermore, the council has also concluded: "The concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa is becoming increasingly vulnerable, in political terms, due to the heightened opposition from the people of Okinawa and, in military terms, due to the enhanced missile capabilities of countries such as China. Even the U.S. military, including the Marine Corps, is dispersing its forces in response to the Chinese missile threat. In order to maintain a stable alliance between Japan and the United States, the concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa should be remedied, and the arrangements regarding the burden of security should be put into proper perspective of Japan as a whole and Asia as a whole."⁹

Especially, in respect to the Marine Corps' new strategy called *Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO)*, the Marine Corps is aiming to use dispersed small combat units to establish temporary positions in critically located remote islands. What should be noted about the Marine Corps promoting EABO is that while potential adversaries intend to target vulnerable, fixed U.S. military bases, the Marines seek to develop a new expeditionary naval structure that is not dependent on

⁸ Bankoku Shinryo Council on the U.S. Military Base Issues (March 2020), "*Opinions on the Consolidation and Reduction of the US Military Bases on Okinawa*", Okinawa, 2020 pp. i-ii

⁹ *ibid.*, p19

expensive, vulnerable, concentrated forward infrastructure, or platforms.¹⁰

The proposals made at the council are not merely an affirmation of the previous claims made by OPG, but they also set out to seek a path, with an acute emphasis on military rationality, for consolidating and reducing the U.S. military bases in Okinawa.

Likewise, in this request, OPG presupposes, as a prerequisite, the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan Security Arrangements.

Okinawa understands that the Biden administration will regard mutual cooperation of its allies as important. We were hoping that the U.S. could do justice to the Japan's position based on the following tenets: a) defusing tensions between the U.S. and China is of paramount importance; b) what is urgently needed is mitigating Okinawa's outsized burden of hosting US military bases.

As we mark the 50th anniversary of Okinawa's reversion to Japan, we request Tokyo and Washington to further work on the consolidation and reduction of the U.S. military bases on Okinawa in order to mitigate the outsized burden on Okinawa.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, "38th Commandant of the Marine Corps, Commandant's Planning Guidance, 2019," p 8, p.19.

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1. Consolidation and reduction of the U.S. military bases on Okinawa:

Requests:

(1) Accelerate further consolidation and reduction of the U.S. military bases on Okinawa.

When carrying out consolidation and reduction, you might want to consider the following basics: a) it is enshrined in *the Okinawa 21st Century Vision Plan* that Okinawa will aspire to be the “it” prefecture where there’s no military bases and which is peaceful and prosperous; b) the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly repeatedly passed resolutions calling for *the pull-out of the U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa*. Thus, it is high time that Tokyo and Washington began to think in terms of setting up a specific numerical goal through consultation and realized this objective. Let’s say, *for the time being, both Tokyo and Washington shall strive to achieve a burden rate of 50% or below on Okinawa in terms of the total land area – military bases and facilities – exclusively used by the USFJ in Japan by dint of the incremental phase-out of the US Marine Corps in Okinawa and so on and so forth.*

(2) Especially focus on the MCAS Futenma’s prompt reversion to Okinawa and its relocation elsewhere outside of Okinawa (some other prefectures or some other countries); abort the unpopular – among Okinawans – construction of a new base at Henoko.

(3) Map out and implement the employment measures for the local LMO workers, who are working on the U.S. military bases and facilities in Japan, in order to minimize the adverse effects on them stemming from the consolidation and reduction of the U.S. military bases on Okinawa.

Explanation:

(1) Consolidation and reduction of the U.S. military bases

As I mentioned upfront, the Okinawa Prefectural Government understands the *raison d’être* for the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. However, the U.S. military in Japan is concentrated on Okinawa, which is blatantly unfair and exceeds our proportional burden by a considerable margin. If you look at the prefecture-by-prefecture ratio of the bases and facilities exclusively used by the USFJ in terms of land size: Okinawa Prefecture accounts for 70.3%; Aomori Prefecture, which ranks second, 9.0%; Kanagawa Prefecture 5.6%; Tokyo 5.0%. It is obvious that Okinawa is taking on an outsized burden.¹¹

The use of expansive land by the U.S. military is affecting the day-to-day living of the Okinawans in many ways: perennial problems such as daily noise pollution of aircraft, gas emissions (odors), field fires and environmental destruction as a result of live shooting exercises, oil pollution of rivers, ocean waters and soil, aircraft accidents, crimes committed by U.S. military personnel.

¹¹ Calculated from some Archives of Okinawa Defense Bureau, Okinawa, see p19 chart 2, chart3

Reducing the footprint of the USFJ in Okinawa would involve retrenching the U.S. Marine Corps on Okinawa by means of relocating their military training elsewhere outside of Okinawa—i.e., some other prefectures or some other countries, doing so would not only lessen the outsized hosting burden imposed on Okinawa but also reduce the accidents and incidents by U.S. military personnel. We strongly request that some 9,000 U.S. Marines on Okinawa be relocated to some other countries in accordance with *the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation and the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas on Okinawa*. It is high time for this to be addressed.

Furthermore, the reversion of the U.S. military facilities and areas south of Kadena Air Base (based on the aforementioned plans) will not only have significant consequences on the future of the U.S. military bases on Okinawa but also make or break the future viability of Okinawa's economic development. Therefore these plans need to be carried out resolutely.

The SACO's definitive final report dictates—when carrying out the reversion plan of the U.S. military facilities located to the south of Kadena Air Base, which is based on the *Consolidation and Reduction of and the Realignment of the U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa*—that the functions of the US military in Okinawa should be relocated elsewhere inside Okinawa. This precondition embedded in the SACO's definitive final report led to the unwelcome construction of a new base at Henokosaki—which is opposed by most Okinawans—as a result of the relocation of Futenma Air Base. Likewise, the reversion of the better half of the Jungle Warfare Training Center in the north has entailed the concentration of helipads around Takae in Higashi village, which are causing big noise pollution. Such being the case, going forward—when it comes to consolidating and reducing the U.S. military bases in Okinawa—the *new iron-clad precondition* that the current US military bases and facilities shall be relocated elsewhere outside of Okinawa prefecture should be instituted.

Even if all the planned reversion were to be implemented within the purview of these plans, Okinawa would still be hosting 69 percent of the U.S. military's exclusive-use facilities in Japan in terms of land size¹²; this would still be nowhere near a proportional burden. Thus, more land should be reverted to Okinawa.

Taking into consideration the ongoing changes in the security environment in the Asia Pacific region in recent years such as increasing vulnerability of U.S. military bases due to the technological sophistication of China's missile capabilities, both the United States and Japan should reconsider flexibly how the U.S. military posture should be structured as well as how the U.S. military bases should be run; after these careful considerations, Tokyo and Washington should accelerate the

¹² *ibid.*, “*Area and Zones Exclusively for Use by the USFJ*.”

At Present in 2020: Japan 26,307ha; Okinawa 18,484ha (70.3%)

Post-Consolidation-and-Reduction: Japan 25,382ha; Okinawa 17,559ha (69.2%)

Calculated on the Assumption that MCAS Futenma Won't Be Relocated Anywhere Within Okinawa.

consolidation and reduction of the U.S. military bases on Okinawa.¹³

What should be foremost on the minds of the policymakers involved is as follows:

- a) Okinawa has enshrined a tenet in the *Okinawa 21st Century Vision Plan*. Okinawa will aspire to be the “it” *prefecture* where there are no military bases and which is peaceful and prosperous. Okinawa will act according to this principle and double down on consolidating and reducing the U.S. military bases in Okinawa.
- b) Okinawa Prefectural Assembly repeatedly passed resolutions calling for the withdrawal of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa.

When engaged in consolidation and reduction, Tokyo and Washington should not only map out the roadmap for consolidating and reducing the US military bases in Okinawa but also set up a specific numerical goal. Tokyo and Washington shall, for the time being, strive to achieve a *burden rate* or alleviation-focused benchmark of 50% or below on Okinawa in terms of the total land area – military bases and facilities – exclusively used by the US military in Japan. When it comes to setting up the burden rate, it is important to have the general consensus of opinion in Okinawa reflected in this benchmark. In so doing, it is hoped that people in Okinawa would be able to acquiesce to the new plan.

Furthermore, in accordance with Article 2.4.(b) of the U.S.-Japan SOFA, Fukuji dam, Arakawa dam in the Jungle Warfare Training Center and Kanna dam in Camp Hansen can be utilized by the USFJ. There has been no military training in and around these dams since 1988. Should the U.S. military carry out military exercises in and around these water sources, Okinawans would be exasperated. We request that, going forward, the U.S. military on Okinawa be disengaged from this joint-use arrangement.

(2) Expedite the reversion of the U.S. Marine Corps Futenma and abort the construction of a new base at Henoko

Since MCAS Futenma is located in the middle of an urban city, adversely affecting the local residents, it is an urgent matter to eliminate the dangers of aircraft accidents and to resolve noise pollution. People in Okinawa are robustly calling for the elimination of such dangers and the prompt reversion of MCAS Futenma to Okinawa.

¹³ Bankoku Shingyo Council on the U.S. Military Base Issues (March 2020). “*Opinions on the Consolidation and Reduction of the US Military Bases on Okinawa*,” Okinawa, 2020, p.ii

However, an increasingly large number of visiting military aircraft are taking off and landing at Futenma; the number of take-offs and landings at MCAS Futenma has skyrocketed in recent years.¹⁴ As a result, local residents still have to bear an outsized burden willy-nilly.

The general consensus of opinion in Okinawa, or their sentiment against the relocation to Henoko has been clearly manifested through the past several elections: two gubernatorial elections; the House of Councilors elections; the House of Representatives elections. Moreover, the Okinawa's referendum in February, 2019¹⁵ also demonstrated that the Okinawa residents are opposed to the reclamation of Henoko by an overwhelming majority. Public opinion really counts.

The Ministry of Defense has proclaimed that it would take 12 years to complete all the procedures indicated in the *Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas on Okinawa*. This means that relocating the base from Futenma to Henoko will not lead to expeditiously eliminating the dangers of MCAS Futenma, which OPG believes has been compellingly corroborated.

Additionally, the Ministry of Defense has revealed that the total outlays of the construction will reach ¥930 billion. Nevertheless, the recently published figure is based on the current assumptions. Going forward, the construction could be further delayed; the cost could further increase.

Hypothetically speaking, even after spending more than 10 years on the construction of the Henoko's new base, the soft spots found in some parts of the seabed in Henoko would most probably result in *unequal subsidence* – which has been pointed out by a savvy specialist.¹⁶ We have a presentiment that the budgets for maintaining the functions of this new base would skyrocket to the stratosphere, and thereby impairing the U.S. Government's trust in Japan.

The plan to build a new base at Henoko cannot be “the only feasible silver bullet” any more. It is like we are getting into the never-never land: it is difficult to complete the construction, to say the least of it. Thus, in light of democracy, environmental destruction, public finance and security, the ongoing project – a permanent, big, new military base – cannot be rationalized. It would make more sense to find a game-changing breakthrough; doing so would redound to the benefit of Japan as well as the

¹⁴ The status quo of the take-offs and landings at MCAS Futenma by Okinawa Defense Bureau, Okinawa, (see Chart 4, p20)

2017: MCAS Futenma-based aircraft, 13,164; Visiting aircraft 415; Total 13,581

2018: MCAS Futenma-based aircraft, 14,576; Visiting aircraft 1,756; Total 16,332

2019: MCAS Futenma-based aircraft, 14,072; Visiting aircraft 2,776; Total 16,848

2020: MCAS Futenma-based aircraft, 16,380; Visiting aircraft 2,590; Total 18,970

¹⁵ 2019 Okinawa Referendum, see (<https://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/henoko/kikaku/touhyoukekka.html>)

“The referendum, which was held in Okinawa on 24 February 2019, asked whether the Okinawa voters approved or opposed the land fill work at Henoko Bay for the construction of a US Marine Corps base.”

Voter Turnout: 52.43%

Support: 114,933 Votes (19.6%). Oppose 434,273 Votes (71.70%); No Opinion Either Way 52,682 Votes (8.70%);

Invalid Votes 3,497 (0.6%)

() represents the percentage of the total votes cast.

¹⁶ A Comment by Shoji Kamao, An Associate Professor at Nihon University

Japan- US alliance.

Not presupposing, as a prerequisite, the relocation to Henoko, Tokyo and Washington should reconsider the construction plan of the Henoko's new base and come up with a feasible plan with a view to promptly eliminating the dangers of and realizing the closure of MCAS Futenma – the principal, original objectives.

(3) Measures for the local employees of U.S. military bases

The local LMO workers, who are working on the U.S. military bases and facilities in Japan, play no small role in maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements by facilitating stable deployment of the USFJ and enabling its smooth and effective day-to-day operations. There are about 9,000 such employees on Okinawa, accounting for 35 percent of the total LMO workers.

I was wondering if the U.S. government could help the Japanese government address the issues of these local LMO employees such as improving their work environment and guaranteeing their employment.

2. Mitigating the burden of hosting the USFJ bases in Okinawa:

Requests:

- (1) The U.S. Forces on Okinawa should double down on the following measures: disperse part of the USFJ troops on Okinawa to some other countries or some other prefectures; do likewise on a rotational basis.
- (2) Above all, immediately embark on the dispersed relocation as well as rotational deployment of military aircraft belonging to MCAS Futenma in order to promptly eliminate its dangers.
- (3) Cancel the deployment of the MV-22 Ospreys on Okinawa.
- (4) Terminate any military training that is beyond the capacity of a military training ground in question.
- (5) Ensure that any operational changes of the U.S. military bases will not impose further burden of hosting US military bases on Okinawa.
- (6) Mitigate the noise pollution of and gas emissions (odors) of military aircraft on Kadena Air Base, MCAS Futenma and so on and so forth. Address any environmental problems stemming from U.S. military activities and solve them.

Explanation:

(1) Dispersed relocation/rotational deployment

To solve varied problems (negative externalities) stemming from the operations of the U.S. military bases—such as noise pollution of military aircraft, environmental pollution and so on—, the USFJ should be engaged in the following measures: a) the consolidation and reduction of the US military bases on Okinawa; b) dispersed relocation and rotational deployment of the U.S. military to some other countries or some other prefectures. What counts is actions—actions that will make the local Okinawans happy in terms of burden mitigation.

Given that the ongoing sea change of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region has precipitated the drastic shift in the U.S. military strategy *from concentration to dispersion*¹⁷, we deem it feasible to obtain the acquiescence of the United States.

¹⁷ Defense News, FY2020 NDAA Section 1253 Report, (16 APRIL, 2020).

"Thornberry Wants \$6 Billion This Year to Launch Counter-China Fund."

(https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2020/04/16/thornberry-wants-6-billion-this-year-to-launch-counter-china-fund/?utm_source=Salthr&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%2004.16.20&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Military%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief)

Admiral Davidson, Commander, U.S. Indo Pacific Command wrote: "It is not strategically prudent, nor operationally viable to physically concentrate on large, close-in bases that are highly vulnerable to a potential adversary's strike capability." Forward-based, rotational joint forces are the most credible way to demonstrate U.S. commitment and resolve to potential adversaries, while simultaneously assuring allies and partners."

In fact, we are aware that General Berger, 38th Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, has reiterated: "The U.S. Marine Corps must disperse its troops in the Indo-Pacific"¹⁸.

We understand that the outsized burden on an affected local community has been mitigated since the Live Shooting Exercises across the Okinawa Prefectural Route 104, which had been in operation until 1997, were relocated to the mainland Japan and diversified across some SDF bases. This shows that—when it comes to relocating and rotating some segments of the USFJ in Okinawa to the mainland Japan—if the Japanese government assumes the overall day-to-day operations of some parts of the USFJ routines through the joint use of SDF bases, as opposed to the situation where the USFJ run them single-handedly, we will be better able to mitigate the adverse effects on the local communities. Thus, the name of the game for the USFJ is to consider using Japan's SDF bases jointly.

Lastly, the rotational deployment of the U.S. Marine Corps to the outside of Japan has already got underway in Australia and could encompass other countries in the Asia-Pacific region such as the Philippines. We consider this move very important in consolidating and reducing the U.S. military bases on Okinawa.

(2) Eliminating the dangers of MCAS Futenma

Eliminating the dangers of MCAS Futenma tops the agenda. Aircraft belonging to MCAS Futenma were responsible for several accidents: a military helicopter crashed into Okinawa International University in 2004; another military aircraft dropped a part onto the roof of Midorigaoka Nursery School in 2017; still another military aircraft dropped a window frame onto the schoolyard at Futenma Dai-Ni Elementary School in 2017; and yet another aircraft dropped some part onto Uranishi Junior High School in 2019. One false step could have led to a disaster, killing some local Okinawans. Therefore, the United States and Japan should address this problem immediately before the worst happens.

(3) Cancel the deployment of MV-22 Ospreys

MV-22 Ospreys at MCAS Futenma are responsible for a number of accidents: an Osprey crashed into the sea off the coast of Abu in Nago City in 2016; Ospreys made lots of emergency landings in the past.

Every time these accidents occurred, OPG and relevant municipalities had requested to no avail that

¹⁸ United States Naval Institute Online News Site (24 September, 2020). "US Should Restructure Indo-Pacific Force Posture."

(https://www.news.usni.org/2020/09/24/berger_u_s-should-restructure-indo-pacific-force-posture)

General David H. Berger, Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps said: "The Marine Corps needs to spread out its forces in the Indo-Pacific region if it wants to be successful in deterring Chinese aggression in the coming decades."

the United States and Japan investigate and make public the causes of the accidents and that they ground MV-22 Ospreys until the causes were identified. Despite these repeated requests, MCAS Futenma went on flying MV-22 Ospreys without giving Okinawa a sufficient explanation and ended up causing similar accidents again and again. We cannot help expressing resentment at the USFJ for how they have handled these cases; and we are also exasperated by the Japanese Government that has long acquiesced to this entrenched practice.

OPG is opposed to the MV-22 Ospreys being deployed to Okinawa. We demand that the following measures be executed: a) The MV-22 Ospreys should be pulled out of Okinawa; b) Training and deployment of the MV-22 Ospreys should be relocated elsewhere outside of Okinawa immediately; c) Actionable measures for alleviating Okinawa's burden should be implemented.

(4) Military training that goes beyond the capacity of a military training ground

There was an accident in 2018: a stray bullet (.50 caliber) from the firing range #10 of Camp Schwab penetrated a window of a farming hut in Sukuta in Nago City. There have been about 30 such incidents of stray bullets since the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. Most of these stray bullets were caused by heavy machine guns, whose firing range was longer than warranted by the capacity of some small military training grounds in question. Is it appropriate to engage in such training at a military training ground whose firing range is shorter than needed?

In 2019 some flares used during military training at Camp Hansen plunged into a private precinct in Kin Town. The local municipalities demand that such training in the vicinities of residential districts be scrapped permanently.

In addition, the parachute drop training on Tsuken-jima is carried out in the waters where local packet boats and fishing boats run their day-to-day business. We had an incident where a parachutist dropped near a breakwater in the southern part of Tsuken-jima, a spot outside the designated waters for military drilling and/or training. One false step and this would have been a disaster; therefore this incident urged the local community to solicit for the discontinuation of such training.

The training grounds for the USFJ on Okinawa are adjacent to residential districts. A disaster could occur any time; the lives and properties of local Okinawans would be jeopardized under such circumstances. Thus, any military training beyond the capacity of a military training ground in question should be discontinued.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported that the bases on Okinawa are too small and located too close to the surrounding residential districts for the Marine Corps to get engaged in military training without constraints.¹⁹ The USFJ should, from an operational point of view, consider relocating their training sites to bigger ones in some other prefectures or some other countries.

By the same token, the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee concurred in 2007 that Kadena Air Base could be used for parachute drop training — which has been and still should be conducted on Iejima instead — under *extraordinary circumstances*. As a result, Kadena Air Base has been repeatedly used for this training purpose over the years. However, there's no stipulation as to exactly what constitutes *extraordinary circumstances*. The USFJ often carried out military exercises despite the Japanese Government lodging a request that parachute drop training be discontinued because the USFJ's exercises in question would not fall within the purview of the extraordinary circumstances.

Parachute drop training on Kadena Air Base should be conducted sternly based on the tenets of the definitive final report of the SACO. The United States and Japan should revoke the 2007 agreement reached by the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee and terminate the parachute drop training on Kadena Air Base.

(5) Changes in the operations of U.S. military bases in Japan

The U.S. is reportedly planning to deploy intermediate-range missiles to Asia. As yet, the U.S. has categorically denied that it has any plans to deploy these missiles to Okinawa.²⁰ Should the U.S. Government deploy these missiles to Okinawa, Okinawans would be burdened with additional hosting task; and their erstwhile serene life would be replaced by one constantly beset by anxiety. Therefore we are resolutely opposed to this plan. Should the U.S. proceed to do so, it would make the Okinawans very much ill-disposed to this new deployment, which would imperil the maintenance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

¹⁹ Bankoku Shinyu Council on the U.S. Military Base Issues, (March 2020), "*Opinions on the Consolidation and Reduction of the US Military Bases on Okinawa*," Okinawa, 2020, p.17.

United States General Accounting Office, "*Military Training: Limitation Exist Overseas but Are Not Reflected in Readiness Reporting*", 2002, p.7

Marine Corps Installation Pacific 2025, "*Strategic Vision*", p.9

²⁰ When Governor Denny Tamaki visited the United States in October 2019, he had it confirmed by Ms. Mary Beth Morgan, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

According to some U.S. news reports, General Berger, the commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps says: "*The U.S. Marine Corps Littoral Regiment will have been deployed on Okinawa by 2027.*"²¹ Although supposedly this deployment will not increase the total headcount, the realignment of the U.S. Marine Corps could lead to more hosting burden on Okinawa, a situation that cannot be condoned.

(6) Anti-noise pollution measures and environmental measures

The negative externalities, or repercussions — stemming from running day-to-day operations of the U.S. military bases and facilities in Okinawa — on the surrounding local communities are varied. Above all, Kadena Air Base and MCAS Futenma, which abut residential districts, are responsible for the noise pollution and the gas emissions odors — during take-offs and landings — that pose intractable challenges to the life environment of the affected local residents.

Regarding these two bases, the realignment of the U.S. military bases has already caused some part of their training to be relocated elsewhere; however palpable results are yet to be seen. Efforts towards minimizing burden still leave much to be desired. The results of the U.S. military's relocating their training elsewhere should be continuously verified. Based on these results, effective measures should be taken expeditiously. Nothing beats making two-pronged efforts: a) dispersed relocation and/or rotational deployment to the outside of Okinawa, be it other prefectures or other countries; and b) the restriction of visiting flights. These actions should be executed in such a way as to redound to the benefit of the affected local communities on Okinawa in terms of alleviating their burden.

Anti-noise-pollution measures should be implemented. Iejima Auxiliary Airfield, for instance, has been aggravating noise pollution since the renovation of its LHD deck. The local residents in the vicinities of military training facilities on Okinawa Main Island are also suffering from noise pollution every day. The use of the helipads should be discontinued at the following sites: N-4 district of the Jungle Warfare Training Center; Phoenix and Gander at Camp Schwab, Falcon at Camp Hansen and so on. Additionally the USFJ had best avoid flying over the residential districts and restrict night flight training.

Regarding the use of highly concentrated organofluorine compounds — such as PFOS and the others — detected in the vicinities of Kadena Air Base, MCAS Futenma and others, it is high time for the USFJ to ban the use of these materials and promptly replace them with more environmentally benign alternatives in order to guarantee the safe quality of tap water. It is also desirable that additional

²¹ Congressional Research Service (May, 2020), "*New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiative*," (<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-defence-japan/us-in-talks-with-japan-about-marine-force-overhaul-says-commander-idUSKCN24K2FQJ>)

General David Berger, Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, made it broadly clear that the Marine Corps will have an operational Littoral Regiment in Okinawa by 2027 and that the United States has begun talks with Japan about this matter. (caveat: not exactly verbatim)

measures be taken — such as investigation into identifying the sources.

In addition to these issues, every environmental problem stemming from any U.S. military activities should be dealt with properly; any construction materials the U.S. military had used that contained asbestos should be disposed of safely; the effects of low frequency sound emitted by Ospreys and others should be investigated; and odors from US military aircraft gas emissions should be prevented.

3. Regarding a reduction of the water areas and air spaces for training around Okinawa:

Requests:

Substantially reduce the water areas and air spaces for training around Okinawa Main Island, and disclose the existence and usage of the temporary training air spaces.

Explanation:

Around Okinawa Main Island, 27 training water areas and 20 training air spaces are provided to the U.S. Forces. The training water areas located in the waters around Okinawa Main Island cover 55,000 square kilometers, accounting for an astounding 71 percent of all the water training areas around Japan.²² The size of the vast training air spaces is 95,000 square kilometers, equivalent to 1.1 times the area of Hokkaido. In addition to the preexisting training air spaces, it has been pointed out that the training air spaces have practically expanded as the U.S. military has newly established temporary training air spaces called *ALTRF* in recent years.

The total number of landings on and take-offs from Kadena Air Base and MCAS Futenma numbered about 67,000 times in 2020, of which visiting aircraft accounted for about 20 percent, i.e., some 14,000 times.²³

For instance, the KC-130 aerial refueling aircraft that have been transferred to MCAS Iwakuni from MCAS Futenma will eventually end up returning to Okinawa for training because the area around Iwakuni is insufficient in size for such training;²⁴ likewise, it is presumed that a lot of visiting aircraft will come to Okinawa for conducting training over the vast training water areas and air spaces located around Okinawa.

The vast training water areas provided to the U.S. military have not only forced out the local fishermen – thereby limiting the fishing grounds – but have also affected the movements to and from these fishing grounds. For example, the vast waters encompassing the *Area Hotel Hotel* and its surrounding waters that are contiguous toward Okinawa Main Island are fertile fishing grounds for bonito, bluefin tuna, and diamond squid. Likewise the waters around *Tori Shima Range* and *Kume Jima Air Station* are home to what professional fishermen would call *Fish Aggregating Device Fishing*,

²² Some Archives Provided by Okinawa Defense Bureau, Okinawa, see p.20 Chart 5.

Water Areas For Training: Around Okinawa 54,938 km²; Around Japan 77,000 km² (71.3%)

Air Spaces For Training: Around Okinawa 95,416 km²

²³ *ibid.*, “The Status Quo of Take-offs and Landings in 2020” Okinawa, see p.21 Chart 6

Kadena Air Base: Kadena-based Aircraft 36,825; Visiting Aircraft 11,061 (Visiting Aircraft Percentage 23.1%)

MCAS Futenma: Futenma-based Aircraft 16,380; Visiting Aircraft 2,590 (Visiting Aircraft Percentage 13.7%)

²⁴ Bankoku Shimryo Council on the U.S. Military Base Issues, (March 2020) “*Opinions on the Consolidation and Reduction of the U.S. Military Bases on Okinawa*”, Okinawa, 2020, p.6.

United States General Accounting Office, (April, 2017), “*Marine Corps Asia Pacific Realignment: DOD Should Resolve Capability Deficiencies and Infrastructure Risks and Revise Cost Estimates*”, April 2017, p.19

or *Pa-ya-o* fishing; they are also famous for farming *Mozuku* seaweed. Such commercial fishing activities have been considerably constrained by the activities of the U.S. military in these waters.

Therefore, the US military should substantially reduce the water areas and air spaces for training around Okinawa, and disclose the existence and usage of the temporary training air spaces.

Furthermore, an approach airspace called *arrival corridor*, or *priority airspace* is said to be designated for the U.S. military aircraft so that they can make priority take-offs from and landings on Kadena Air Base and MCAS Futenma, as a result of which the flight altitude is set at 1,200 feet (360 meters) or lower for the civilian aircraft taking off from and landing on Naha Airport as an air traffic control measure.

In order to guarantee the safety and stability of air traffic and to meet skyrocketing demand of passenger traffic, going forward, we would like to ask both Tokyo and Washington to expand flight routes and review the air control regime near the air spaces around Okinawa.

Besides, an accumulated total of 11 U.S. military aircraft executed *low-altitude flying* three times over Zamami village and Tokashiki village between the end of December 2020 and January 2021. Not seeming to relent, more military aircraft conducted *low-altitude flight training* over the Cape Hedo in Kunigami village in February 2021. Military drilling and/or training outside the designated facilities and zones will render the affected local Okinawa residents panic-stricken. Therefore we strongly demand that any military drilling and/or training outside the designated facilities and zones not be carried out.

4. Radically revising the Japan-U.S. SOFA

Request:

It is high time the Japan-U.S. SOFA were revised promptly.

Explanation:

The Japan-U.S. SOFA—not having been revised even once for nearly six decades since it was concluded—has been getting more and more incongruous with the needs of the times and the Japanese public expectations amid growing awareness of human rights and environmental issues. For this reason, Okinawa prefecture earnestly solicited for the revision of the Japan-U.S. SOFA on three different occasions.

OPG conducted research on the SOFAs of some NATO member countries such as Germany, Italy, Belgium, the U.K. as well as those of the Philippines and Australia, the last two of which accept the U.S. military as visiting forces. The research has revealed that these countries have put the U.S. military activities under control to the extent that they can apply to the U.S. military each of their respective domestic laws and regulations such as civil aeronautics law. Tokyo and Washington should take into consideration how these U.S.-SOFA-bound countries are actually running the treaty; in so doing they should set about revising the Japan-U.S. SOFA so as to better protect the lives and properties of the Japanese.

In our opinion the fact that the Japanese laws are inapplicable to the U.S. Forces under the SOFA in spite of the global coronavirus pandemic — was one of the major causes of the large-scale cluster outbreaks at MCAS Futenma and Camp Hansen in 2020. The Japan-U.S. SOFA needs to be swiftly revised, including the quarantine issue that has come to light at this juncture of the pandemic.

Upon dispersing and deploying Okinawa's troops to the mainland Japan on a rotational basis, it is important for the Japanese Government and local municipalities to conclude agreements on *the use of training facilities by the U.S. Forces* that shall delineate the scope of the USFJ's activities in terms of agreed hours and types of training and/or drilling they are allowed to perform; these agreements will go a long way towards resolving the apprehensions of the local residents.

Moreover, local host municipalities such as Kadena Town are eager to conclude a usage agreement in order to mitigate the frequent damage caused by the day-to-day operations of the U.S. military's exclusive-use bases and facilities. Tokyo and Washington had better consider concluding usage agreements with these local municipalities as well as doing justice to the local concerns and wishes.

5. Regarding deliberations towards further consolidating and reducing the U.S. military bases in Okinawa:

Requests:

- (1) Actively discuss a plan for the consolidation and reduction of the U.S. military bases on Okinawa – which follows on the heels of the *United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation* – in the *Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee* (“2+2” Meeting), the next *Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI meeting)*, and so on.

When it comes to having aforementioned deliberations, it is imperative that a new committee – consisting of the three entities: Okinawa Prefecture, the Japanese Government, and the U.S. Government (SACWO: SACO with Okinawa) – be established.

- (2) Establish a “Track II” forum for dialogue consisting of experts from Japan, the United States, and Okinawa. Discuss the following issues: a) drastically consolidating and reducing the U.S. military bases on Okinawa, b) promptly eliminating the dangers of MCAS Futenma, and c) accelerating its eventual closure.

Explanation:

- (1) Both governments of Japan and the U.S. should discuss the following agendas

Despite the mercurial security environment and the new U.S. military strategy in the Asia-Pacific region in recent years, it would still be feasible to consolidate and reduce the U.S. military bases on Okinawa, which I believe would not only bolster the stability in Asia but also help maintain the U.S.-Japan Security Arrangements.

We would like to urge both Japan and the U.S. to take our opinions as constructive, and to participate meaningfully in the deliberations at the next *DPRI meeting*, *2+2 meeting* and so on.

The local municipalities’ opinions were not sufficiently reflected in the *SACO’s definitive final report* in 1996 or the *Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa* in 2013 because neither OPG nor these local municipalities was able to have a say in the decision-making process of these plans. Therefore, we would like to solicit both governments to establish a new committee (SACWO), where the three parties of Tokyo, Washington and Okinawa can address the following agendas: a) verify the progress of the consolidation and reduction of the U.S. military bases on Okinawa that has already been underway since the SACO agreement, b) map out a plan for mitigating Okinawa’s outsized burden.

(2) Track II dialogue

The security environment of Asia is becoming increasingly precarious due to the shifting power balance: China is enhancing its military capabilities and is doubling down on its maritime ambitions; China has also improved its capabilities for *anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)* such as short-range missiles and cruise missiles; and North Korea is developing nuclear weapons and missiles, too.

Strategy-wise, the U.S. military, giving China a good run for its money, has been mapping out new operational concepts — such as *Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)* and *Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO)* — to embrace the big changes.²⁵

In order to promptly eliminate the dangers of and to accelerate the closure of MCAS Futenma, and to double down on the drastic consolidation and reduction of the U.S. military bases on Okinawa — amid the ongoing sea change in security environment —, a *Track II* forum for dialogue consisting of experts (from non-governmental sectors) from Japan, the United States, and Okinawa should be established. The *Track II* level will serve as a platform for intellectual discussions, where the experts will make situation assessment and new policy proposals. In so doing, we can set up an effective discussion framework that we believe will empower them to think outside the box.

It is important to realize productive discussions at the *Track I*, the intergovernmental level, by utilizing the assessment and proposals made at the *Track II* level. The process of relaying the assessment and proposals at the *Track II* level to the *Track I* level will help facilitate productive discussions towards consolidating and reducing the U.S. military bases in Okinawa.

²⁵ Bankeku Shinryō Council on the U.S. Military Base Issues, (March, 2020) “*Opinions on the Consolidation and Reduction of the US Military Bases on Okinawa*”, Okinawa, 2020, p.12

6. Tension reduction and confidence building in Asia:

Requests:

- (1) Strive to strengthen deterrence and get laser-focused on tension reduction as well as confidence building in the region with a view to fostering further development and maintaining stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
- (2) Support the endeavors Okinawa is making in order to build a robust network for regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

Explanation:

(1) Dialogues in the Asia-Pacific region

There are two prominent forces at work in the Asia Pacific region: tensions over security and closely interrelated economic relationships. Okinawa is at the forefront of security issues, i.e., the Senkaku Islands and the existence of vast U.S. military bases.

On the other hand, Okinawa's economic relations have grown stronger with Asian countries; the number of Okinawa-bound tourists has skyrocketed because of booming economies and rising incomes in Asian countries.

In order to further enhance prosperity and to maintain stability of the region, Tokyo and Washington should zero in on strengthening deterrence capabilities, reducing tensions and building confidence within the Asia-Pacific region.

(2) Okinawa Prefecture's efforts towards building a robust network for regional cooperation

Having leveraged its geographical advantages of being located in the center of Asia—encompassing the mainland Japan, China, the Korean peninsula, Taiwan, and South East Asia—the Ryukyu kingdom aspired to become the *Bankoku Shimryo*, or a bridge between peoples and cultures through trading with other countries.

However, Okinawa was plunged into an Armageddon—the only battlefield in Japan during WWII 76 years ago; some 200,000 people including about 100,000 local civilians fell victim to the war. Okinawa, which was put under the administration of the U.S. Forces, had been separated from the mainland Japan for 27 years after the war. In the 1950s, the U.S. Forces expanded their military bases by employing what is called *bulldozers and bayonets*, which is a term for expropriating land. To this day, vast U.S. military bases still continue to exist on Okinawa.

On the other hand, Okinawa now interacts with Asian countries in many fields ranging from tourism and economy to culture and peacemaking and so on and so forth.

Knowing that military security is not the way to go, Okinawa can play active roles by tapping into its history and geographical advantages: promoting exchanges and building trust across a wide spectrum of issues between Japan and the Asia-Pacific region.

In addition to the hitherto exchanges, while collaborating more closely with Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Okinawa aspires to be a platform for discourse about issues in the region such as security, disarmament, maritime issues, disaster relief and *human security—the environment, healthcare, human rights and so on*.

A prolonged US-China confrontation would throw into the starkest relief the urgent need of Tokyo and Washington to build a network of confidence building in the Asia-Pacific region. Based on this understanding, I am confident Okinawa could be a force to be reckoned with if it became a regional hub for confidence building, which would robustly buttress Japan's economy and security.

We ask the Japanese Government and the U.S. Government to provide us with active support so that Okinawa can become a hub for a regional cooperation network in the Asia-Pacific region. I was wondering if Tokyo and Washington could give us unstinted help in order for us to achieve this objective.

Chart 1: The transition of the land area exclusively used by USFJ in Okinawa and Mainland Japan and the transition of the percentage of land area used by USFJ in Okinawa




Chart 2: The percentage of prefecture-by-prefecture land area exclusively used by USFJ (bases and facilities)





Chart 3: the percentage of the land area exclusively used by USFJ in terms of each prefecture's total size




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**Chart 6: The Number of Take-offs and Landings
And Percentage of Visiting Aircraft
(Kadena Air Base and MCAS Futenma)**



Based on some archives provided by Okinawa Defense Bureau